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 1 
Summary 
The right to development (RTD) is an inalienable human right that has been 
affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly in the Declaration on the 
Right to Development (DRD), in 1986. The right has also been reaffirmed 
by several international declarations and in two regional human rights 
conventions, the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and Arab Charter on Human Rights, and it is often discussed in 
development discourse. 
 
In the RTD development is viewed as a human right. This human right 
entails that development is a process where all human rights will be 
realized. An important component of this right is that the development 
process needs to be framed in terms of entitlements for rights-holders and 
duties on duty-bearers. 
 
The concepts of rights-holders and duty-bearers are crucial in any human 
right, since effect implementation of a right warrants an understandable 
framework that denotes what actor has a right and what actor has a 
corresponding duty to realize the right. In the DRD two rights-holders are 
designated, the human person and all peoples. Furthermore the DRD 
prescribes that states are the duty-bearers, and that these duty-bearers have 
obligations in the national as well as the international level. Although these 
actors have been identified in the DRD and there have been discussions on 
the RTD in international discourse for the better part of three decades, there 
still remains much confusion on how to interpret who the rights-holders are, 
especially what “all peoples” mean, and the interrelationship between the 
rights-holders. The same confusion is present when discussing duty-bearers. 
The presence of an international obligation for duty-bearers, pegs the 
questions: what the different obligations of states are in the national and the 
international level? As well as what the interrelationship between the 
different forms of duties is? 
 
This thesis aims at clarifying the understanding of rights-holders and duty-
bearers in the RTD and pointing out gaps that still needs to be resolved. The 
intention is that a clear understanding of these concepts will hopefully lead 
to a more implementable right.  
 
In this thesis it is argued that the RTD is essentially a right of individuals. 
They have the right both in their individual capacity as human beings and as 
part of a collective, a “people”. In the collective individuals cannot actuate 
an individual claim, but they are beneficiaries as the right of the “people” 
they are a part of is realized. In regards to “people” it has been found that 
there exist misunderstandings in regards to the definition of a “people”. The 
different definitions that have been expressed are that “people” are states, 
the entire population of states or indigenous people and minority groups. 
This thesis has clarified that “peoples” should not be misunderstood as 
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meaning the state, rather it is collectives of persons. The true identification 
of a “people” is that it denotes the entire population of a state, as well as 
indigenous peoples and minority groups when they are present. Furthermore 
a question regarding rights-holders is whether they exclusively refer to 
individuals and “peoples” in developing countries or if they apply to all 
human persons and all peoples. This thesis has argued that since human 
rights are universal the latter notion must be a correct interpretation of the 
scope of rights-holders. 
 
In regards to duty-bearer the thesis clarifies that they are states that are 
understood to have obligations to create a favourable national and 
international environment for the realization of the RTD. The primary 
obligation falls on states in the national context where they have an 
obligation to implement the right. However, to enable the full realization of 
the RTD it is deemed necessary that states cooperate to implement the right. 
This entails that states have an individual duty and a collective duty to 
advance the realization of the RTD internationally. Both of these duties are 
discussed in detail in the thesis. 
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Sammanfattning 
Rätten till utveckling (på engelska “Right to development” (RTD)) är en 
mänsklig rättighet som har bekräftats av FN: s generalförsamling i ”the 
Declaration on the Right to Development” (DRD) från 1986. Rätten har 
också bekräftats av flera internationella deklarationer och två regionala 
mänskliga rättighetskonventioner, ”the African [Banjul] Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights” och “Arab Charter on Human Rights”. Dessutom 
diskuteras RTD ofta i utveckling diskurs.  
 
I RTD anses utveckling vara en mänsklig rättighet. Denna mänskliga 
rättighet innebär att utveckling är en process där alla mänskliga rättigheter 
kommer att uppfyllas. En viktig komponent i denna rättighet är att 
utvecklingsprocessen måste utformas som en rätt för rättighetsinnehavare 
(eng: rights-holders) och plikt för skyldighetsbärare (eng: duty-bearers).  
 
Begreppen rättighetsinnehavare och skyldighetsbärare är en viktig 
komponent i alla mänsklig rättighet, eftersom en effektiv implementering av 
en mänsklig rättighet kräver att det finns en tydlig identifiering av vilken 
aktör som har en rätt och vilken aktör som har en motstående skyldighet att 
realisera rättigheten. I DRD identifieras två rättighetsinnehavare, individen 
och alla ”folk” (eng: ”peoples”). Vidare föreskriver DRD att stater är 
skyldighetsbärare och att de har skyldigheter i den nationella samt 
internationella sfären. Även fast dessa aktörer har identifierats i DRD och 
DRD har diskuteras internationellt i nära tre decennier så råder det 
fortfarande avsevärda oklarheter kring hur man ska tolka vilka 
rättighetsinnehavarna är, speciellt vad alla ”folk" betyder, och även 
förhållande mellan rättighetsinnehavarna. Samma oklarheter finns 
närvarande när skyldighetshavare diskuteras. I och med att en internationell 
förpliktelse har inkluderats så är frågorna: vilka de olika skyldigheterna är i 
den nationella samt den internationella kontexten? Dessutom så frågan om 
det inbördes förhållandet mellan internationella och nationella skyldigheter 
relevant? 
 
Denna uppsats syftar till att klargöra förståelsen av rättighetsinnehavare och 
skyldighetsbärare i RTD och att identifiera luckor i förståelsen av dessa 
koncept. Förhoppningen är att en klar förståelse av dessa koncept kan leda 
till en rättighet som är mer genomförbar.  
 
I denna uppsats anges det att RTD är i huvudsak en rättighet för enskilda. 
De har en rättighet både i sin kapacitet som individer och som en del av ett 
kollektiv, ett "folk". Som en del av kollektivet har inte individer ett enskilt 
anspråk till rättigheten, tanken är istället att de är förmånstagare när 
”folkets” rättighet realiseras. Dessutom så har uppsatsen identifierat att det 
råder missuppfattningar angående hur ”folket” ska definieras. De olika 
definitioner som har framförts är att ett ”folk” betyder staten, hela 
befolkningen i en stat, ursprungsbefolkningar och minoritetsgrupper. I 
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denna uppsats har det klargjorts att ett ”folk” inte ska uppfattas som en stat. 
”Folket” ska istället förstås som hela befolkningen i en stat, och när de finns 
även ursprungsbefolkningar och minoritetsgrupper. Ännu en fråga som har 
avgjorts angående rättighetsinnehavare är om RTD är en rättighet för alla 
individer och folk, eller om det ska uppfattas att rätten är exklusiv för 
individer och folk i utvecklingsländer. I uppsatsen hävdas det att den senare 
tolkningen måste uppfattas som den riktiga eftersom mänskliga rättigheter 
är universella. 
 
Uppsatsen klargör att skyldighetsbärare är stater och att de har en skyldighet 
att skapa en nationell och en internationell miljö som främjar 
förverkligandet av RTD. Statens skyldighet i den nationella kontexten anses 
vara en primär skyldighet, och det är nationellt som rättigheten främst 
implementeras. För att kunna implementera rättigheten till fullo anses det 
även vara nödvändigt att stater samarbetar för att förverkliga rättigheten. 
Detta innebär att stater har en individuell och en kollektiv skyldighet att 
främja förverkligandet av RTD globalt. Båda skyldigheterna diskuteras i 
detalj i uppsatsen. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
The right to development (RTD) is an inalienable human right that has been 
affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in the 
Declaration on the Right to Development1 (DRD), in 1986. The adoption of 
the right was the culmination of discussions to include a human right to 
development that had been on-going since the 1970s.2 In the DRD it is 
prescribed that development is a process where all human rights will be 
realized.3 This right incorporates all human rights, economic, social and 
cultural as well as civil and political, and solidifies the notion that all human 
rights are indivisible and interdependent.4 The importance of the right has 
been reaffirmed several times, and it has also been proposed in the UNGA 
that the right is as important as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.5  
 
Since the right was adopted in the DRD continuous efforts have been taken 
in the United Nations (UN) to operationalize the right and there have been 
plans to codify the right into a treaty.6 This has lead to the creation of 
several UN bodies tasked with defining the right and making it 
implementable. However, the efforts taken have seldom led to a real effect.  
 
One of the problems with the right is that nearly 30 years after its adoption 
in the DRD states still disagree over fundamental principles in the right.7 
One of the most contentious issues regards the interpretation of the rights-
holders and the duty-bearers in the RTD. This is problematic. Clear 
information on what actor has a right, rights-holder, and what actor has the 
correlative duty to fulfil the right, duty-bearer, is imperative for the 
possibility to understand a human right. Without this understanding the 
                                                
1 Declaration on the Right to Development, UN General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 
December 1986 UN Doc A/RES/41/128. The full declaration can be found in Supplement 
A of this document. 
2 Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, ”The Right to Development: Reframing a New Discourse for the 
Twenty-First Century”. In: Social Research, Vol. 79, Issue 4, 2012, p. 839. 
3 Sengupta, Arjun, ”On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development”. In: Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2002, p. 846 ff. [Hereinafter referred to as Sengupta 
(2002)]. 
4 Ibid., p. 840. 
5 Marks, Stephen P. and Andreassen, Bård A., ”Introduction”. In: Andreassen, Bård A., 
Marks, Stephen P. (eds.), Development as a Human Right: Legal, Political and Economic 
Dimensions, 2nd ed., Intersentia, Antwerp, 2010, p. xxiii.  
6 Human Rights Council Resolution 4/4, of March 30 2007, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/4/4, 
para. 2 (d); Marks, Stephen P., “Introduction”. In: Marks, Stephen P., Implementing the 
Right to Development: The Role of International Law, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Geneva, 
2008, p. 11. Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/05659.pdf [Accessed on 
17 May 2013]. 
7 Fukuda-Parr, p. 839. 
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realization of human rights is not feasible. In the DRD two rights-holders 
are designated, the human person and all peoples. Furthermore the DRD 
prescribes that states are the duty-bearers, and that these duty-bearers have 
obligations in the national as well as the international level. 
 
Although these actors have been identified in the DRD, there still remains 
much confusion on how to interpret who the rights-holders are, especially 
what “all peoples” mean, and the interrelationship between the rights-
holders. The same confusion is present when discussing duty-bearers. The 
presence of an international obligation for duty-bearers, pegs the questions: 
what the different obligations of states are in the national and the 
international level? As well as what the interrelationship between the 
different forms of duties is? 
 
In the RTD this information is not clear from the DRD and there is a 
tendency among scholars and states to tangle up the concepts. Moreover 
most scholars, although usually mentioning both rights-holders and duty-
bearers, often chose to only study one of the concepts extensively. Due to 
these facts there is a need for a holistic study on the concept of both rights-
holders and duty-bearers, and their interrelationship. This is especially 
relevant, for the purpose of implementing the right or if there are efforts to 
codify the right into an international human rights convention.  
 
1.2 Purpose and research question 
The purpose and research question of this thesis is to clarify the 
understanding of the rights-holders and the duty-bearers in the RTD, as they 
are stated in the DRD, and to identify eventual gaps in the understanding of 
these concepts. A clear understanding of these concepts is imperative for the 
implementation of the right. This research question is split into six sub-
question. These regard specific questions in regards to rights-holders and 
duty-bearers and are explained in below.  
 
The first question examined is the rights-holders. In the DRD two rights-
holders are identified, the human person and the individual, article 1 (1). As 
such the RTD is both an individual and a collective right. However, there is 
some confusion in connection to these rights-holders. These confusions 
mainly regard the question of who a “people” are in the context of the RTD, 
and the interrelationship between the human person and “peoples”. There is 
therefore a need for clarifications on both of these aspects. The research 
questions attributed to my study on these subjects are: 
• What is the interrelationship between human persons and “peoples” 
as rights-holders in the RTD? 
• What is the identity of a “people” in the RTD?  
 
The second scope of this paper concerns duty-bearers in the RTD. The actor 
that has been identified as the duty-bearer in the RTD is the state. According 
to the DRD the state has obligations in two spheres, the national and the 
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international. The first obligation is that states have the primary obligation 
to implement the right in the national context, articles 2 (3) and 3 (1) DRD, 
secondly states also have a duty to cooperate and take collective action in 
the international sphere to further the realization of the RTD, articles 3 (3) 
and 4 (1) DRD. What is problematic in the understanding of duty-bearers is 
how to delimit the different obligations, the national and the international. 
This means that there is a need for clarification of the exact scope of 
obligations that states have in the national as well as the international 
context. Furthermore there is a need to understand what the obligations to 
cooperate and to take collective action means, in the context of the RTD. 
The sub-questions in regards to duty-bearers are: 
• What are the duty-bearers’ obligations in the national context and in 
the international context? 
• Is there an added value in having international obligations in the 
RTD? 
• What is the interrelationship between the obligations of the duty-
bearers in the national and international context? 
 
Finally when all of this information has been untangled and the concept of 
rights-holders and duty-bearers are clear this paper will conclude by 
pointing out if there are any gaps in the understanding of rights-holders and 
duty-bearers that needs to be explored further. The final sub-questions are 
thus: 
• Are there any gaps in the understanding of rights-holders and duty-
bearers in the RTD? 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
The content of the study is, as stated above, to examine the rights-holders 
and the duty-bearers of the RTD, basing my examination on the content of 
the DRD. I will therefore not extend my study to encompass human rights 
obligations in other legal regimes. However, there is a caveat, where it is 
suitable I might use interpretations of provisions in other international 
instruments as analogies, when these can help the interpretation of duties in 
the RTD. More on this will be discussed in the section on method and 
theory. 
 
Another area that is closely related to the concept of rights-holders and duty-
bearers is the concept of justiciability. However, justiciability will not be 
examined at all in this paper. This is because the two different concepts are 
distinct from each other. My research aims at elaborating on the 
identification and functions of the rights-holders and duty-bearers in the 
RTD. Justiciability is distinct from this scope, since it concerns the question 
of implementation of a right. More specifically, it is when the right-holder’s 
claim (or right) has not been implemented or enforced by a designated duty-
bearer that justiciability comes into question.   
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Another aspect that will not be studied is implementation of the RTD. 
Several UN working groups and the IE has conducted research on this 
matter. I will only utilize these sources materials when it is applicable to the 
research questions of this thesis. However, I will not generally discuss the 
question of implementation of the RTD. 
 
1.4 Method and Theory 
As I have written in the purpose section, there are several problems 
concerning the understanding of rights-holders and duty-bearers. This fact 
should not be understood as that there is a lack of information on this 
subject. Both UN working groups and experts have written on this subject, 
as well as scholars and practitioners. But as has been explained above, these 
examinations are often tangled or only discuss one dimension of the 
concepts, i.e. either rights-holder or duty-bearers.  
 
The method applied in this paper is to conduct a literature review, 
encapsulating writings from recognized scholars and UN working groups. 
Most often these writings are specifically on the topic of the RTD. The 
thesis is thus mainly a descriptive study with the aim of clarifying the 
concepts in the RTD. The UN reports that are studied often come from the 
Open-Ended Working Group on the Right to Development (OEWG), High-
Level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development  
(HLTF), the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right to 
Development (WGGE) and the Independent Expert on the Right to 
Development (IE). This methodology has been utilized throughout the 
thesis. Furthermore, some parts of this study have necessitated research on 
the travaux préparatoires of the DRD. While some parts necessitated a 
study of sources on human rights in general, or other human rights 
disciplines than the RTD. One of these chapters is the third chapter, which 
studies general theories on the relationship between rights-holders and duty-
bearers. 
 
In the chapter that examines the rights-holders a literature review has been 
undertaken as the basis of the study. However, the question of identifying 
the rights-holder, “peoples”, and the reasoning of including this rights-
holder required considerable research of the travaux préparatoires of the 
DRD. This include writings from the Working Group of Governmental 
Experts on the Right to Development (WGGE), which was the first working 
group in charge of developing the RTD, and summary records from the 
meetings of the Third Committee of the General Assembly. Furthermore the 
examination of the identity of a “people” also necessitated research into the 
area of self-determination where a lot of work has been undertaken to 
identify what the term “people” denotes.  
 
The chapter that discusses duty-bearers in the RTD is mostly a literature 
review by recognized sources writing on the RTD. However, since a large 
part of this chapter examines the international obligations of states, this 
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paper also studies secondary international instruments that prescribe duties 
on states in the international level. The aim of which is to make analogies on 
the interpretation of state obligations in the DRD, whenever the obligations 
in the RTD is unclear. 
 
Material that is presented in the study will continuously be analysed, and 
both the chapter on rights-holders and duty-bearers will end with general 
conclusions that analyses the whole chapter. The final chapter, thus, only 
aims at drawing on previous analysis, and will offer a consolidated 
conclusion. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Paper 
Excluding this introduction, the paper consists of five chapters. The second 
chapter is an introduction to the RTD. The belief is that an insight to the 
history and content of the right is necessary to properly understand the 
examination of the research question. Therefore a brief introduction is 
included in the second chapter. In the third the concept of human rights in 
general is examined. This examination is confined to mainly discuss the 
relationship between rights-holders and duty-bearers in human rights. This 
information will be used when analysing the relationship between the rights-
holders and the duty-bearers in the RTD. 
  
The fourth chapter discusses the rights-holders in the RTD, which are the 
human person and “peoples”. It first examines the distinction between these 
different types of rights-holders and the reasons why the drafters chose to 
have dual rights-holders. Furthermore the chapter explains the role of the 
human person in the RTD framework, since that subject enjoys the right 
both as a rights-holder and a beneficiary. Lastly the chapter examines 
“peoples”. In this section of the chapter what a “people” is in the context of 
the RTD will be identified, and who represents a “people”. Lastly the 
chapter discusses the interrelationship between the rights-holders in the 
RTD and whether it is a right for all “peoples” and individuals in the world, 
or whether rights-holdership is confined to individuals and peoples in 
developing countries. 
 
In the fifth chapter the duty-bearers in the RTD is in focus. The identified 
duty-bearers are states, and they have obligations both in the national and in 
the international level. Both levels will be devoted a respective section. 
Furthermore more, general questions in regards to the duty-bearer structure 
in the RTD is discussed, such as complex and contested issues, as well as 
justifications for having a duty in the international level. Lastly the 
interrelationship between these levels of the duty is examined. 
 
The sixth and last chapter offers general conclusions on the thesis subject. 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the interrelationship between all the 
actors in the RTD. The chapter can be viewed as a consolidated finding of 
all the analyses and conclusions I have made in previous chapters. 
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Furthermore this final section also points out gaps in the understanding of 
rights-holders and duty-bearers that could not be answered by the thesis. 
      
1.6 Terminology 
Certain terms that is used in the paper need to be clarified. First of all I use 
rights-holder and subject interchangeably as denoting the person or entity 
that has a rights claim. Furthermore duty-bearer and object is used 
interchangeably as the entity that has a duty in regards to a rights claim. In 
regards to duty-bearers the terms duty, obligation and responsibility are used 
to denote the same thing. Lastly in the DRD the human person is mentioned 
as a rights-holder; in this study I will also use the term individual as 
denoting that same subject. 
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2 The Right to Development 
This chapter intends to give the reader a brief introduction to the RTD.  
2.1 History 
The question of who should be the rights-holders, and which actors had a 
duty in respect to development has been hotly debated since the origin of the 
RTD. Mohammed Bedjaoui8 has explained that the first concept of the RTD 
was developed in the 1960s.9 At this point in time the world was becoming 
decolonized and the right was argued by the developing states. In this first 
form of the right it was intended as a right of poor states and “peoples” to 
development, which could be claimed against rich states.10 It was not until 
1972 that the RTD was introduced as a human right after being launched by 
the Senegalese jurist Keba Mbaye. This was the first instance that 
development practice became an issue that was discussed within the 
framework of human rights.11  
 
At the same time an intense debate on the so-called New International 
Economic Order took place in the world community, especially within the 
auspice of the United Nations. This movement was led by several prominent 
nationalist from developing countries. The movement was heavily 
influenced by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries’12 
successful oil embargo, and in the movement it was widely believed that 
this was the start of a restructuring of the world economy. During the first 
half of the 70s, there were, therefore, several negotiations in the UN which 
aimed at changing the fundamental politics behind “global political of trade, 
finance, investment, aid and information flows.”13 These discussions where 
generally initiated by developing countries that used their majority within 
the UN to more or less force these topics on the agenda.14  
 
Over time the method of furthering development as a human right has 
primarily been promoted by developing states. On the other side western 
states, who have generally been more developed have been hesitant to 
                                                
8 Bedjaoui has, among other things, been a judge at the International Court of Justice, and 
foreign minister of Algeria.  
9 Bedjaoui, Mohammed, ”The Right to Development”. In: Bedjaoui, Mohammed (ed.), 
International Law: Achievements and Prospects, UNESCO, Paris, 1991, p. 1177 f. 
10 Bedjaoui, p. 1179; Beetham, David, ”The right to Development and Its Corresponding 
Obligations”. In: Andreassen, Bård A., Marks, Stephen P. (eds.), Development as a Human 
Right: Legal, Political and Economic Dimensions, 2nd ed., Intersentia, Antwerp, 2010, p. 
102.  
11 Uvin, Peter, ”From the Right to Development to the Right-Based Approach: How 
’Human Rights’ Entered Development”. In: Development Practice, Vol. 17, No. 4/5, 2007, 
p. 598. 
12 More commonly refered to as simply ”OPEC”. 
13 Uvin, p. 598. 
14 Ibid., p. 598. 
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incorporate the right to development within the legal human rights regime. 
The reasoning behind this has been two-pronged, the first is the argument 
that this will lead to a diminishing of human rights in general,  and 
secondly, developed states are unwilling to be subjected to claims on their 
resources from developing states, an outcome they fear will come with the 
RTD.15 
 
In 1981 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) 
passed a resolution that urged the formation of the first working group on 
the RTD. The Commission decided to assemble a group of 15 governmental 
experts that would “[…] study the scope and contents of the right to 
development and the most effective means to ensure the realization, in all 
countries […]”.16  
 
Later during the year the first legal instrument that mentioned the RTD 
came into fruition. In June of 1981 the Organization of African Unity 
adopted the treaty known as the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights17 (ACHPR), which entered into force on 21 of October 
1986.18 In Article 22 of the charter the High Contracting Parties included the 
RTD, which was framed in the following manner: 
 
Article 22 
1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and 
cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity 
and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.  
 
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure 
the exercise of the right to development. 
 
Furthermore the drafters of the treaty made two more references to the RTD 
in the ACHPR in Articles 20 (1) and 24, even though the latter seems to 
refer to development in a pure environmental context. 
 
After discussing the content of the right for the better part of a decade, there 
was finally an international effort to formalize the RTD. This led to the 
adoption of the Declaration on the Right to Development by the UN General 
                                                
15 Rosas, Allan, ”The Right to Development”. In: Eide, Asbjørn; Krause, Catarina and 
Rosas, Allan (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – A Textbook, 2nd rev. ed., 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 2001, p. 122 f. 
16 United Nations Commission on Human Rights Resolution 46 (XXXVII), of 11 March 
1981. The United Nations Economic and Social Council approved UNCHR decision to 
establish this working group in a subsequent decision, see United Nations Economic and 
Social Council decision 1981/149, of May 1981. 
17 Article 22 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981.  
18 African Union, List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/African%20Charter%20on%20Human%20and%20P
eoples'%20Rights.pdf [Accessed on 19 May 2013]. 
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Assembly (UNGA) in 1986. However, since the declaration was adopted as 
a resolution, it is not of a binding nature.19 
 
As Peter Uvin describes, this could have been the end of the right. He 
argues that several rights that have been established as declarations in this 
manner, end up fading out into obscurity by being handed over to be studied 
by various working groups or commissions. In the end the usual outcome is 
that the right does not amount to any significant impact. This could very 
well have been the case for the right to development. However, in 1993 the 
the Second United Nations World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 
(Vienna Conference) reaffirmed the right.20 At the conference the right was 
incorporated in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, with the 
following statement: 
 
The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the right to 
development, as established in the Declaration on the Right to 
Development, as a universal and inalienable right and an integral 
part of fundamental human rights.21  
 
The RTD was adopted, in this manner, by a consensus, which resulted in a 
comeback for the right with renewed vigour.22  
 
This development also led to the formation of a host of different institutions 
that had the mission of developing and advancing the RTD. I will shortly 
summarise these various bodies below. 
 
Subsequent to the Vienna Conference, the UNCHR also confirmed that the 
RTD was an inalienable human right in a resolution. In the resolution the 
UNCHR decided to institute the Working Group on the Right To 
Development, which had the mandate to investigate and recommend how 
the RTD could be implemented and realized.23 
 
When this Working Group’s mandate ended in 1995, it was followed up by 
a new working group called the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on the 
right to Development.24 At the conclusion of the latter group’s mandate, 
they recommended that a follow-up mechanism should be established to 
continue the advancement of the RTD.25 
 
                                                
19 Rosas, p. 123. 
20 Uvin, p. 598. 
21 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. On Human 
Rights, 48th Sess., 22nd plenary, mtg., part. I, para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23. 
Available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en 
[Accessed on 11 February 2013]. 
22 Uvin, p. 598. 
23 United Nations Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/22, of 4 March 1993. 
24 Rosas, p. 125; Right to Development, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
50/184 of 6 March 1996, UN Doc. A/RES/50/184. 
25 Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on the Right to Development on its 
second session, of 7 November 1997, U.N. doc. E/CN.4/1998/29, paras. 76-81. 
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The UNCHR acknowledge these suggestions in 1998 by recommending the 
set-up of two institutions to follow the development of the RTD. The first of 
which was the OEWG, and second was the IE.26 The Economic and Social 
Council affirmed this recommendation and decided on their formation.27 
The last of the institutions that was created to develop this area of law was 
the HLTF.28  
 
Today the RTD can be found in several international instruments. Apart 
from the DRD and the ACHPR it can also be found in; the Arab Charter on 
Human Rights29 (ACHR)’, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples30 (UNDRIP), and the Millennium Declaration.31 
 
2.2 The Content of the Right to 
Development 
The definition of development, in the context of the RTD, has been 
elaborated in the Preamble of the DRD as; 
 
[…] development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural 
and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of 
the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the 
basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in 
development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting 
therefrom32 
 
This definition notwithstanding, it is not simple to in easy terms describe the 
actual content of the RTD. However,  several scholars and the IE have 
examined the actual right and we can find suitable interpretations for the 
right in these studies. 
 
The IE has given us an authorative interpretation on what the RTD entails 
by referencing article 1 (1) of the DRD. That article states that 
The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of 
which every human person and all peoples are entitled to 
                                                
26 United Nations Commission on Human Rights Resolution E/CN.4/RES/1998/72 of 22 
April 1998, para. 10.  
27 United Nations Economic and Social Council Decision 1998/269, of 30 July 1998, UN 
Doc. E/DEC/1998/269. 
28 United Nations Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/7, of 13 April 2004, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/7 and United Nations Economic and Social Council Decision 2004/249, 
of 22 July 2004, UN Doc. E/DEC/2004/249. 
29 Article 37 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted 22 May, 2004. 
30 Article 23 and preambular para. 6 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 13 September 2007, 
UN Doc. A/RES/61/295. 
31 United Nations Millennium Declaration, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
55/2 of 18 September 2000, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2, paras. 11, 24. 
32 Preambular para. 2, DRD. 
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participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural 
and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.33 
  
This article gives us three principles for what the RTD is according to the 
IE. 
 
first, there is a human right called the right to development which 
is inalienable; second, there is a particular process of “economic, 
social, cultural and political development” in which “all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized”; and third, 
the right to development is a human right by virtue of which 
“every human person and all peoples” are entitled to “participate 
in, contribute to and enjoy” that particular process of 
development.34 
 
When describing the second principle the IE concludes that the RTD is a 
process of development that aims at realizing all human rights.35 It is also 
concluded that all human rights will be realized in the process of 
development, meaning that there is a specific substantive content in the 
right. These two aspects of the RTD will be discussed in different sub-
sections, starting with studying the RTD as a process of development. 
 
2.2.1 The Right to a Process of Development 
Viewing the RTD as a process of Development needs to be contextualized 
by looking at prior conventional theories and methods of development, 
which to a certain degree are still present today.  
 
Traditional development theory has often had one primary objective, 
economic growth (increase in GDP and GNI). The conventional discourse 
of development was thus wealth accumulation. The methods employed to 
achieve the objective was to expand the capacity to produce goods and 
service and thereby creating a larger economy. However, utilizing this 
method to develop does not necessarily mean that the state is combating 
problems such as income inequality and poverty. In essence, there is much 
proof that only concentrating on economic growth, mainly result in 
funnelling more resources to the segments of society that are already 
wealthy. Furthermore, most claims that development through economic 
growth will help the most marginalized and poor people in society, such as 
the ”trickle down-effect” (which entails that eventually all persons will 
                                                
33 Article 1 (1) DRD. 
34 Third Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Mr. Arjun 
Sengupta, Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2000/5, of 2 January 
2001, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/WG.18/2, para. 4. [Hereinafter referred to as Independent 
Expert’s 3rd Report]. 
35 Right to Development: Note by the Secretary-General – Report of the Independent Expert 
on the Right to Development, 17 August 2000, UN Doc. A/55/306, para. 4. [Hereinafter 
referred to as Independent Expert’s 2nd Report]. 
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benefit from a growing economy since wealth will trickle down from the 
rich), has been disproved. This method of ”development” must therefore be 
viewed as a moral failure when discussing development in terms of lifting 
up all segments of society from poverty.36  
 
The following presentation will explain Sengupta’s concept on the RTD as a 
process of development. First of all he has explained that development 
efforts that only aim at economic growth and do not address or show 
improvement in “social development” such as health, education, gender 
balance and increased respect and protection of human right, both economic, 
social and cultural, as well as civil and political, does not fulfill the process 
of development inherent in the RTD.37 
 
The RTD incorporates a process of development that takes account of 
justice and equity. In this way the process takes account of the most 
deprived, poverty stricken segments of society, by improving their living 
standard and enhancing their capabilities to keep strengthening their social 
standing. The end goal of development is that the all citizens of a country 
are well of.38 
 
As opposed to previously preeminent development theory, the process of 
development inherent in the RTD aims a strengthening the capabilities of 
individuals. The strengthening of a person’s capabilities to live the life he or 
she wants to live comes by expanding the person’s substantial freedoms. 
The expansion of these freedoms should therefore be both the ”’primary 
end’ and the ’principal means’ of development, both in a ’constitutive role’ 
and in the ’instrumental role’”39. Sengupta has, while refering to Amartya 
Sens theory on capability, further explained it as;  
 
In that sense development becomes the expansion of capabilties or 
the substantive freedoms to allow people to lead the kind of life 
they value. But then capabilities are also instrumental to further 
expansion of these capabilties. Being educated and healthy permits 
them, for example to enjoy their freedoms. The free agency of 
people who enjoy civil and political rights is essential for that 
process.40 
 
The RTD is a human right. It has been explained as a right to human 
development, and as such there are specific concerns when implementing 
development. A human right puts emphasis not only on reaching 
development objectives, but also on the process in which these objectives 
are being fulfilled. This approach to development means that the objectives, 
as well as the process of development are human rights in their own right. 
This means, as explained above, that participation, equity, justice and 
                                                
36 Peet, Richard & Hartwick, Elaine, Theories of Development : Contentions, Arguments, 
Alternatives, 2nd ed., Guilford Press, New York, 2009, p. 2.  
37 Sengupta (2002), p. 848. 
38 Ibid., p. 848 ff. 
39 Ibid., p. 851.  
40 Ibid., p. 851. 
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freedom are central concepts within the RTD, and are a part of the human 
right. Furthermore the process cannot violate other human rights. There is 
also a need that the process is framed in terms of obligations and 
responsibilities since it will establish accountability for the actor in charge 
of development, and lastly there needs to be a system in place for observing 
and rectifying any failures in the implementation of the process.41  
 
Furthermore Sengupta has written that the process should be employed in a 
rights-based manner, meaning that it takes into account human rights values 
in decision-making and implementation of development efforts. These 
human rights values are namely participation, non-discrimination, 
accountability, and transparency as well as equity in developmental 
processes. Another dimension that is important for the query of this paper, is 
that the goals of development need to be phrased in entitlements or claims 
of rights-holders and corresponding obligations to promote or protect these 
values by duty-bearers. Lastly, there is a requirement that the procedures for 
implementing the obligaton need to be “realized through appropriate social 
arrangement.“42 
 
In essence the right to development, urges subjects within development 
activities to refocus their view, from a macro-level, concentrating on 
national economic growth, to a micro-level, focusing on the individual 
person and their inherent right to self-realization. Each person is according 
to the RTD allowed to a process of development that enhances his or her 
own capabilities and freedoms so that they are free to live the kind life they 
want. 
 
2.2.2 The Substantive Content of the Right 
In regards to the substantive content of the right the IE has termed that the 
RTD is a vector. A vector entails that the right is a composite of several 
elements, which are all the human rights “together with the rates of growth 
of representative resources such as per capita consumption, output and 
employment.”43 He points out that this vector has two features. The first is 
that all the elements have to be realized in a rights-based manner. The 
second feature is that all of the elements are interdependent. This means that 
the “level of realization of a right” in the vector is dependent on the “level 
of realization” of other rights in the vector. Furthermore realizing the rights 
are also dependent on the increase of resources, which are also a part of the 
vector.44 Furthermore viewing the RTD as a vector has an important 
                                                
41 Ibid., p. 851. 
42 Sengupta (2002), p. 846. 
43 Study on the Current State of Progress in the Implementation of the Right to 
Development Submitted by Mr. Arjun K. Sengupta, Independent Expert, Pursuant to 
Commission Resolution 1998/72 and General Assembly Resolution 53/155, of 27 July 
1999, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/WG.18//2., para. 67. [Hereinafter referred to as Independent 
Expert’s 1st Report]; Independent Expert’s 2nd Report, para. 23. 
44 Independent Expert’s 2nd Report, para. 24. 
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consequence on the assessment on the fulfilment of the RTD. The IE states 
that the RTD can only be considered as improved if at least one element of 
the vector is increased with any other element being diminished.45 Therefore 
it is required that no human right are violated or that no retrogression of 
human rights occur if the RTD is going to be realized. 
 
2.2.3 Legal Force of the Right to Development 
The RTD can be found in different instruments, among them the DRD, the 
ACHPR and the ACHR. These are documents with a varied precision when 
describing the concept. Furthermore the instruments carry a different degree 
of legal force.  
 
Even though international consensus has been reached on the existence of 
the RTD, see the Vienna Conference, the right is not legally binding for the 
whole world. Since the right is only codified into a declaration, in the 
international sphere, there is no general legal obligation on states in regards 
to the right. However, regionally the right is incorporated in the ACHPR 
and the ACHR, and the state parties to those convention do have a legal 
binding obligation to obey the RTD.46 
 
Furthermore Eva Brems has argued that, since the DRD is a UNGA 
resolution it is in fact binding on the organs under UNGA as well as the UN 
Secretariat. This would mean that these institutions needs to adhere to the 
principles prescribed in the right whenever they plan and implement any of 
their activities.47 
 
2.3 What Actors Are Mentioned in the 
Right to Development 
There are essentially three actors mentioned in the DRD and subsequent 
texts concerning the right. They are: 
• States, 
• the human person, and 
• all “peoples”.48 
 
In the following portion of this chapter it is briefly explained in which 
context, as a duty-bearer or as a right-holder, these subjects appear. Since 
the topic of the thesis is rights-holders and duty-bearers these actors will be 
elaborated on in more detail in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. 
 
                                                
45 Ibid., para. 25. 
46 Brems, Eva, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague, 2001, p. 452. 
47 Ibid., p. 452. 
48 See the DRD, inter alia articles 1, 3 and 4. 
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2.3.1 Right-Holders 
The right-holders in the RTD are mentioned in the first article of the 
declaration. It states: 
 
Article 1 
1. The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue 
of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to 
participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural 
and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.  
 
2. The human right to development also implies the full realization 
of the right of peoples to self-determination, which includes, 
subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants 
on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full 
sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources. 
 
 
There are, therefore, two subjects that have been pointed out as right-holders 
in the DRD, the human person and all “peoples”.  
 
2.3.1.1 The Human Person 
The human person is the central subject within the RTD, and as such has the 
right to be the beneficiary and active participant of the right, which is 
prescribed in Article 2 (1) DRD and also explained in the preamble of the 
same declaration. As have been quoted above Article 1 (1) of the declaration 
also states that the human person has a right to “contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development”49. 
 
Further ahead in this paper, Section 4.2, the rights of the human person is 
explained in more detail. 
 
2.3.1.2 Peoples 
In Article 1 it is also mentioned that all “peoples” are rights-holders within 
the right to development. Aside from having the same rights as the every 
human person in the first paragraph of the mentioned article, they also have 
the right to self-determination, including the “full sovereignty over all their 
natural wealth and resources”.50 
 
In Section 4.3, the concept of “peoples” is clarified. Relevant questions are 
what the definition of a “people” is, and who represents a people’s claim for 
development under the RTD.  
 
                                                
49 Article 1 (1) DRD. 
50 Article 1 (2) DRD. 
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2.3.2 Duty-Bearers 
The duties of the state can be found in several articles in the DRD. First of 
all the state has the primary responsibility to formulate national 
development plans, and to actually realize the RTD.51 This refers to a duty 
purely within the domestic context. 
 
Furthermore the DRD prescribes that states, in addition to having a national 
duty, also have a responsibility internationally to create favourable 
condition for the implementation of the RTD. It is also mentioned that states 
have an obligation to work collectively, as well as individually, when 
formulating international development policies to achieve the RTD.52 
 
It is evident that the obligation of the state is dual, one set of duties being in 
the domestic sphere and the other set in the international sphere. In this 
paper this dichotomy will be referred to as the state’s internal (domestic) 
and international duties.  
 
In chapter 5 of this paper, I will discuss the duties of states in greater detail. 
I will also show what duties correlate to the state’s international obligation 
and what duties are within the state’s internal obligation. 
                                                
51 See, inter alia, Articles 2-3. 
52 See, inter alia, Articles 3-4. 
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3 Duty-Bearer and Right-Holder 
theory 
To be able to properly analyse and understand the relationship of the rights-
holders and duty-bearers in the RTD it is imperative to have clarity on the 
nature of rights and in extension the interrelationship of the claimant of 
rights and the bearer of the corresponding duties. This chapter will examine 
theories on this subject. This first section will briefly explain what human 
rights are and the interrelationship between rights-holders and duty-bearers. 
The next section, in turn will examine different views on how to understand 
the duties in human rights. First the nature of duty-bearers obligations will 
be examined, thereafter the notion of perfect and imperfect human rights 
will be studied, and lastly the notions of respect, protect and fulfil will be 
combined with imperfect and perfect obligations.  
 
The word right is often used with two different connotations, Donnelly 
explains them as “rectitude” and “entitlement”. These terms represent either 
a moral or a political value. In terms of rectitude the word is used as 
“something being right or wrong”, an example being the phrase this is “the 
right thing to do”. In contrast when using the word right in terms of 
entitlement, the focus is on “someone having a right”.53 Ronald Dworkin 
originally explained the difference between the utilization of the word right. 
Dworkin explains that when someone has the right to do something (right as 
an entitlement, as Donnelly would phrase it) she has a claim or a liberty to 
do something, even though it might be the wrong thing for that person to do. 
An example could be smoking, the individual is at liberty to smoke, 
eventhough it could be viwed as the wrong thing to do to yourself, since it 
causes cancer. At the same time, when someone has a right, it is often 
understood that it is wrong to interfere when the person exercises that right. 
When something is the right thing for a person to do (rectitude in 
Donnelly’s terms), it does not necessarily mean they have a right to do this 
thing, as meaning it would be wrong for another person to interfere in the 
first person’s conduct. Dworkin contextualizes this with an example of an 
soldier being captured by enemy forces. In this scenario, it could probably 
be argued that the right thing to do for the soldier is to try to escape, but at 
the same time her captors are not doing wrong if they interfere in the 
soldier’s attempted escape.54  
 
Donnelly explains that another way that differs with rights as “entitlement” 
is in the relationship between rights and obligations. While rights as 
“rectitude” focuses on a specific standard of conduct, e.g. “that is wrong”, 
and highlights the duty-bearer’s obligation to follow the standard, right as 
entitlement focuses on the right-holder’s claim. As such the duty-bearer 
                                                
53 Donnelly, Jack, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed., Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 2003, p. 7. [Hereinafter refered to as Donnelly (2003)]. 
54 Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, 1977, p. 188 ff. 
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need to draw attention to the right-holders privilege to enjoy the right.55 It is 
only in the explanation of a right as an entitlement that we are discussing 
human rights. As such the word right on the continued text, will only refer 
to this meaning, unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
 
The rights-holders relationship to the right itself is privileged. If M has a 
right to x, it is owned by that subject and if not already in M’s “possession” 
it is owed to her by a duty-bearer. Furthermore x has a specific standing, so 
the right-holder’s claim to it could normally not be rejected because of any 
other concern, such as “social-policy and moral and political grounds.”56  
 
If we reconcile the two previous paragraphs on the relationship to a right, it 
shows that the rights-holder has a relationship to both the right and the duty-
bearer. In this sense a right is centred on the right-holder, and generate “a 
field of rule-governed interactions”, that are controlled by the subject.57 
Donnelly explains it as: 
 
‘A has a right to x (with respect to B) specifies a right-holder (A), 
an object of the right (x), and a duty-bearer (B). It also outlines the 
relationships in which they stand. A is entitled to x (with respect to 
B). B stands under correlative obligations to A (with respect to x). 
And, should it be necessary, A may make special claims upon B to 
discharge those obligations. 58 
 
Being entitled to a right means that the subject A has an entitlement to x, as 
such if B does not meet his obligations towards A, A is entitled to restitution 
in the form of a special remedial claim against B, and at the same B could 
be the subject of sanctions. This separates rights as entitlements from 
rectitude since an entitlement gives the subject an enforceable legal claim, 
while the rectitude rights might bring moral consequences for the duty-
bearer but no legal sanctions.59 
 
The dichotomy of rights and duties has been discussed by several people 
and explained in many ways. While writing on the concept of the RTD 
Sengupta often reverts to utilizing a description of rights proposed by 
Morton Winston. Winston asserts that rights should be understood in the 
following manner:  
 
An agent A has a right R to a particular good G if and only if the 
possession of R by A provides the basis of a justified claim that 
society has a duty to protect (and promote) A’s enjoyment of this 
good G. […] What is important about rights is that they give their 
holders a basis for claiming that other agents within society have 
certain duties which they are bound to fulfill with respect to their 
(the right-holders’) enjoyment of certain goods. Rights, in short, 
                                                
55 Donnelly (2003), p. 7. 
56 Ibid., p.8. 
57 Ibid., p. 8. 
58 Ibid., p. 8. 
59 Ibid., p. 8. 
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are grounds of duties of others which benefit the right-holders.60 
 
What can be ascertained from these defintions is that there is an inherent 
binary relationship in human rights, between the rights-holder and the duty-
bearer. That means that the existence of human rights implies the existence 
of a correlative duty.61  
 
3.1 The Nature of Duty-Bearers 
Obligations 
The understanding of the different forms of obligations that the duty-bearer 
has in respect to human rights is also of relevance to understand the 
relationship between rights-holders and duty-bearers.   
 
For the understanding of the duty-bearers duties under human rights 
scholars have mentioned that there are three types of obligations. These are 
“the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil.”62 This methodology was 
first proposed by Henry Shue but with a different terminology. It was later 
refined into respect, protect, fulfil by Asbjørn Eide. This notion of the nature 
of obligations is often referred to as the tripartite typology.63 
 
The obligation to respect entails that the duty-bearer need to refrain from 
violating the rights-holders enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to 
protect means that the duty-bearer need to ensure that third parties do not 
infringe on the rights-holders enjoyment of human rights. Lastly the 
obligation to fulfil entails that the duty-bearer need to actively work for the 
realization of human rights.64 This is especially relevant when the rights-
holder would not be able to enjoy the right otherwise.65   
                                                
60 Winston, Morton E. (ed.), The Philosophy of Human Rights, Wadsworth, Belmont, 1989, 
as cited in, Sengupta, Arjun, ”The Human Right to Development”. In: Oxford Development 
Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2004, p. 187. 
61 Salomon, Margot E., Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the 
Development of International Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 115. 
62 Eide, Asbjørn, ”Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights”. In: Eide, 
Asbjørn; Krause, Catarina and Rosas, Allan (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – 
A Textbook, 2nd rev. ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 2001, p. 23. 
63 Sepúlveda, Magdalena, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2003, p. 157 ff. 
64 Maastricht Guideline 6, in: Boven, Theo C. van, Flinterman, Cees & Westendorp, Ingrid 
(eds.), The Maastricht guidelines on violations of economic, social, and cultural rights: 
proceedings of the workshop of experts organised by the International Commission of 
Jurists (Geneva, Switzerland), the Urban Morgan Institute on Human Rights (Cincinnati, 
USA), and the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights of Maastricht : University, 22-26 
January 1997, Studie- en Informatiecentrum Mensenrechten, Utrecht, 1998, p. 4. 
65 Sepúlveda, p. 162. 
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3.2 Perfect and Imperfect Obligations 
Even though a right is intrinsically linked with a corresponding duty it does 
not necessarily mean that there is only one duty or one duty-holder to each 
right. A statement such as this has been the cause of much debate in the 
human rights community. Classically human rights has been interpreted 
very inflexibly, where every right had corresponding duties that show 
distinct methods which would lead to the realization of the right, and one 
duty-bearer that was responsible for this implementation. If the model could 
not be applied to a right the opinion was that it was not realizable.66 
Amartya Sen has referred to this forced linkage by the Kantian concept of 
“perfect obligation”.67   
 
Sen is, however, not of the opinion that rights are only effective when a 
state of “perfect obligations” prevails. He argues that human rights are 
entitlements shared by all human beings, and that everyone should reap its 
benefits. The belief is then that instead of making the duty a strict 
requirment on a specific person or agency, “the claims can be generally 
addressed to all those who are in a position to help”. Sen argues that this 
argument would correspond to the Kantian concept of “imperfect 
obligations”.68 
 
Sengupta has adopted this train of thought in his various examinations of the 
RTD, albeit with some alterations to make it fit better with both a legal and 
moral view of human rights. It is his belief that human rights nowadays do 
not mandate the rigid structure that it had earlier. By referencing Winston 
Sengupta asserts that the valuable component of human rights is that they 
bind certain actors, i.e. the duty-bearers, to fulfil the right towards the 
rights-holder and that both of these types of actors are identified. However, 
there might be several actors with a duty in respect to a right.69 
 
Furthermore the pertinent factor that makes a claim into a right is the 
feasibility of realizing that claim in the assigned institutional arrangement. 
According to Sengupta, only claims that can be realized should be 
considered rights. If the claim is unfeasible it cannot.  Furthermore Sengupta 
mentions that “feasibility in principle does not automatically lead to actual 
realization. Realization would depend on the agreement of the duty holders 
to work together according to a program and some binding procedures to 
honor the agreement.”70 In regards to a binding agreement on procedure, 
Sengupta argues that this could take several different forms, and does not 
exclude arrangements that are not legislated. In this context “an agreed 
procedure, which can be legally, morally or by social convention binding on 
                                                
66 Sengupta (2002), p. 843 f. 
67 Sen, Amaratya, Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 
230. 
68 Ibid., p. 230. 
69 Sengupta, Arjun, ”The Human Right to Development”. In: Oxford Development Studies, 
Vol. 32, No. 2, 2004, p. 187. [Hereinafter referred to as Sengupta (2004)]. 
70 Sengupta (2002), p. 844. 
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all parties, would be necessary to realize a valid right, that is, a right that is 
feasible to realize through interaction between the holders of the right and of 
the obligations.”71 
 
This notion of human rights could be useful when analysing the duty-
bearers within the RTD. 
 
3.3 Linking Perfect and Imperfect 
Obligations With the Obligations to 
Respect, Protect and Fulfil 
The IE has suggested that perfect and imperfect obligations can be linked to 
the different types of obligations that states have. This section will briefly 
examine this assertion. 
 
The IE has based his reasoning on the linkage between the obligations to 
respect, protect and fulfil and the notion of perfect and imperfect 
obligations, on the thoughts of Stephen Marks.72 Sengupta argues that 
obligations to respect and protect are typically perfect obligations. Which 
means that these obligation are legally enforceable, or as the IE writes; 
“enforced through judicial process, where ‘accountability takes the form of 
enforceable remedies’”.73 The obligation to fulfil, which incorporates 
obligations to facilitate, provide and facilitate, however, is recognized as an 
imperfect obligation. The IE describes imperfect obligations as obligations 
that are legal in nature, but nonjusticiable74. He writes that they prescribe 
 
[…] general commitments to pursue a certain policy or achieve 
certain results which are typically not justiciable, that is, 
immediate individual remedies through the courts are not normally 
provided, where the State falls short of its responsibilities with 
respect to these obligations, although they are still legal 
obligations75 
 
Essentially the state do have an obligation to realize these rights, 
progressively, and they are exemplified as creating an environment 
                                                
71 Ibid., p. 845. 
72 Sadly enough the IE does not offer a reference to which publication or other form of 
informational source from which he got the quotes from Marks. However, it is my belief 
that Sengupta made a correct reference, since Stephen Marks has been thanked in the first 
footnote of the report for efforts in commenting and giving suggestions to the author, p. 25. 
Any wrongful citations should therefore have been omitted by Marks during his review.  
73 Fourth Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Mr. Arjun 
Sengupta, Submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2001/9, 20 December 
2001, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/2, para. 35. [Hereinafter referred to as Independent 
Expert’s 4th Report]. 
74 Ibid., para. 35 
75 Ibid., para. 35. 
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conducive to realize the RTD, or supplying different forms of resources, 
“‘when the normal functioning of the market and other institutions fail.’”76 
                                                
76 Ibid., para. 35. 
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4 The Rights-Holders Within 
the Right to Development 
This chapter studies the rights-holders in the RTD, which is imperative for 
the understanding of the RTD. The topics that are studied are the identity of 
the different rights-holders, what their respective rights are and the 
interrelationship of the rights-holders in the RTD. As has already been 
described in chapter 2 of this thesis, article 1 of the DRD has identified two 
different rights-holders, the human person and all “peoples”. These two 
rights-holders have different properties, the first one denotes an individual 
and the latter a collective. There is therefore a need to discuss the reasoning 
behind such an assigning of rights-holders, and how to view the different 
subjects in the rights-structure. This is examined in the first section of this 
chapter. The second section examines the rights of the human person. The 
following section will describe the rights of “people” and it will identify 
what a “people” is the RTD. In the fourth sections the interrelationship of 
the two forms of rights-holders is assessed. This section aims to discuss 
whether both human persons and “people” have national rights, or whether 
the rights of “people” only refer to a claim towards other states. Lastly, it 
will be assessed if the RTD only is applicable in regards to individuals and 
“peoples” in developing countries, or whether the right is universal and 
applies for all “peoples” and individuals. 
 
4.1 The Distinction Between Individual 
Rights and Collective Rights 
The DRD points out two distinct categories of rights-holders in the RTD. 
The first is the human person, which represents an individual level. The 
second is “peoples”, which represents a collective level.77 In the collective 
right, the group itself is the subject of the right. The understanding of the 
collective as opposed to individuals should therefore be: “while groups 
themselves are collective entities (made up of individuals), group rights may 
be said to reflect the rights of ‘units and not simply as aggregations of 
individuals’ and so, although ‘the individual is the object of protection, the 
fundamental element is the group’.”78 This construction of rights-holders 
was deliberately chosen, since it was believed to be the best way to realize 
the RTD. This chapter will describe the reasoning behind choosing these 
two rights-holders for the RTD. This entails an examination of how states 
argued for the rights-structure when drafting the RTD, and the view of 
                                                
77 Article 1 DRD.  
78 Salomon, Margot E with Sengupta, Arjun, The Right to Development: Obligations of 
States and the Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples, Minority Rights Group 
International, London, 2003, p. 10. 
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scholars on how to interpret the interrelationship between a collective and 
an individual right. 
 
This division of the right into two categories of rights-holders, where one 
subject is a collective, was widely argued during the drafting of the DRD. 
Some states unequivocally argued that human rights could only be viewed 
as individual rights, and should not be constructed as collective rights. One 
main concern of these states was the belief that collective rights could be 
used as an argument for violating the rights of individuals on the basis of 
furthering the rights of the collective.This would mean that collective rights 
inevitably consume or undermine individual’s rights.79 Other states highly 
contended this assertion. These states argued that the collective was 
imperative in terms of development operations and in turn collective rights 
where necessary for a right to development. Furthermore they argued that 
the collective dimension of the right, would only be complementary to the 
individual right, and thus it could not be used as an argument or tool of any 
sort for the violation of individual rights.80  
 
Collective rights were finally included in the adopted DRD, but contentions 
still exist, mainly within academia, on how the relationship between a 
collective right and an individual right should be viewed. Donnelly has 
challenged the existence and the suitability of collective rights. He argues 
that the basis for human rights is the inherent dignity of the human person. 
Due to this reason, Donnelly argues, the human rights are formulated to 
distinguish the individual from society as a whole. He points at two factors 
that show this relationship, the first is that the rights are held against society 
and the state. The second being that the individual’s right should always 
prevail if there is a conflict between the right and societal interests or goals. 
He claims that the concept of collective rights, therefore, deviates from the 
very fundament of human rights.81 
 
Alston has spoken out in favour of collective rights. Stating that viewing 
rights as “exclusively of an individualistic nature” may be unproductive for 
the implementation of rights. He argues that a primarily individualistic view 
does not take into account that people live in communities and that the 
prospect for individuals’ development is linked to their socio-economic 
                                                
79 See, inter alia, Third Committee of the General Assembly, Summary records of meetings 
No. 36 of the forty-first regular session, held on 5 November 1986, UN Doc. 
A/C.3/41/SR.36, paras. 13 ff. (statement from Sweden); paras. 18 ff. (United States of 
America); Third Committee of the General Assembly, Summary records of meetings No. 
34, of the fortieth regular session on 8 November 1985, UN Doc. A/C.3/40/SR.34, paras. 1 
f. (the Netherlands). 
80 See, inter alia, Third Committee of the General Assembly, Summary records of meetings 
No. 37 of the forty-first regular session, held on 6 November 1986, UN Doc. 
A/C.3/41/SR.37, para. 4 f. (Cuba); para. 25 (Mexico); para. 56 (Senegal). 
81 Donnelly, Jack, ”In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and politics of the Right to 
Development”. In: California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 15, Issue 3, 1985, p. 
495 ff. [Hereinafter referred to as Donnelly (1985)]. 
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context, and to people living in their vicinity.82 It is believed that it is 
imperative that certain collective rights exist so that individual rights can 
actually be realized. Some rights are therefore suitable to be assigned 
directly to the collective, although the individual must always be the end 
beneficiary when the right is realized.83 Sengupta also contends that an 
overly individualistic view of human rights is undesirable. He states that the 
prerogative of human rights is to establish a specific right for an identified 
rights-holder and corresponding obligations on duty-bearers, which makes 
the implementation of the right feasible. Viewing human rights in this 
manner should make it illogical to distinguish between collective and 
individual rights-holders, rather what is important is that the right follows 
the methodology of human rights, ergo that there is at least one rights-holder 
and at least one duty-bearer.84 Instead the imperative question would be the 
construction of the respective rights, of the collective and the individual, so 
that the collective dimension does not oppose the realization of the 
individual.85 
 
In the RTD the right of “peoples” is supposed to be exercised for the benefit 
of the individual, a fact that is evident from the formulation “The human 
person is the central subject of development and should be the active 
participant and beneficiary of the right to development.”86 As such, the 
collective right, in addition to furthering the claim of the collective entity as 
an objective in itself, the collective entity also acts as a vessel for the 
realization of the individual persons within that entity’s rights.87 Therefore it 
is evident that the realization of all the rights in the RTD (collective as well 
as individual) intends to advance the individual’s development. In this sense 
the collective right should not be viewed as opposed to the individual’s right 
to the RTD.88 
 
The idea of featuring the collective, “people”, and the individual as rights-
holders in the RTD stems from the thought that the collective is a necessary 
component of development endeavours. It is, however, important to 
remember that the collective is a compilation of individuals, as such the 
furthering of the rights of the collective, is a step forward in the 
development of the individuals as well. As such the collective should only 
act as a vessel for the realization of the RTD of individuals. Therefore the 
standing of individuals and collectives should not be viewed as 
contradictory to each other.  
 
                                                
82 Alston, Philip, ”The Shortcomings of a ”Garfield the Cat” Approach to the Right to 
Development”. In: California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 15, Issue 3, 1985, p. 
516. 
83 Salomon with Sengupta, p. 9. 
84 Sengupta (2002), p. 858 f. 
85 Ibid., p. 862. 
86 Article 2 (1) DRD.  
87 Salomon with Sengupta, p. 10. 
88 Sengupta (2002), p. 862 f. 
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In conclusion, this structure of parallel individual and collective rights-
holders in the RTD, should not be viewed as two subjects that are mutually 
exclusive, but as complementary. 
 
4.2 The Human Person as a Rights-Holder 
This section explores the position of the human person in respect to the 
RTD. The first section briefly enumerates the various rights of individuals 
in the DRD. The second sub-section discusses the dual nature of individuals 
relationships in the RTD, one as a rights-holder and the other as a 
beneficiary of the rights of “peoples”.   
 
4.2.1 The Rights of the Individual Within the 
Right to Development 
The functioning and content of the RTD as a system of norms has been 
described in the second chapter of this thesis. Therefore this section only 
briefly recounts the various rights that have been bestowed on human 
persons in the operational articles of the DRD. In the declaration the 
individual has a right to;  
1. “[…]participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, 
cultural and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized”;89 
2. be the central subject of development;90 
3. “ […] active, free and meaningful participation in development and 
the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom”;91 
4. Conditions favourable to the RTD at the national and international 
level;92 
5. “equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, 
education, health services, food, housing, employment and fair 
distribution of income”.93 
 
                                                
89 Article 1 (1) DRD. 
90 Article 2 (1) DRD. This article also prescribes that the individual has a right to 
participate, but since this is referenced in the bullet-point above I thought it be redundant to 
reference it again. Furthermore it states that the individual is the beneficiary of the RTD, 
but as will be described in section 4.2.2, beneficiaries do not have legal claims, and as such 
are not rights-holders. 
91 Article 2 (3) DRD. 
92 Article 3 (1) DRD. 
93 Article 8 (1) DRD. 
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4.2.2 The Dual Nature of the Individual’s 
Relationship to the RTD 
The individual is present as a participant in the RTD in two different 
capacities. As a subject to the individual right, and as a beneficiary of the 
collective right. In this portion of the essay the distinction between the 
concepts will be described.  
 
Rights-holders are easily defined. Summarized it entails that the subject has 
a claim (entitlement) to a right, and that a corresponding duty-bearer is 
charged with the realization of the right, from which the rights-holder can 
direct his personal claim.94 
  
A beneficiary on the other hand, even though meant to gain from the 
realization of the right, is not in a position to actuate a personal claim in 
respect to the right.95 The distinction from a right-holder is therefore that a 
beneficiary does not have legal standing to claim the right. 
 
 
4.3 Peoples as Rights-Holders 
The second rights-holder in the RTD is “peoples”. This section explores 
what “peoples” are and their rights in connection to the RTD. The first sub-
section will briefly enumerate the rights that have been granted “peoples” in 
the DRD. In the following that sub-section the definition of a “people” in 
the context of the RTD is examined. This sub-section discusses whether a 
“people” should be interpreted as a euphemism for the state, as denoting the 
entire population of a state, or whether it can be understood as a small 
domestic group, such as indigenous peoples and minority groups. 
Furthermore this section discuss who represents “people”, an important 
question since each subject who has a right should be able to claim it.  
 
4.3.1 The Rights of People Within the Right to 
Development 
In this section I will briefly list the various rights that have been bestowed to 
“peoples” in the operational articles of the DRD. The rights of “peoples” are 
to: 
                                                
94 The International Dimensions of the Right to Development as a Human Right in Relation 
with other Human Rights Based on International Co-operation, including the Right to 
Peace, Taking into account the Requirements of the New International Economic Order 
and the Fundamental Human Needs, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1334, 1979, p. 43. [Hereinafter referred to as Report of the Secretary-General 
(1979)]. 
95 Ibid., p. 43. 
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1. “[…]participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, 
cultural and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized”;96 
2. the “full realization of the right to self-determination, which includes 
[…] the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all 
their natural wealth and resources”;97 
3. “ […] active, free and meaningful participation in development and 
the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom”;98 
4. Conditions favourable to the RTD at the national and international 
level.99 
 
4.3.2 Definition of a People 
To adequately be able to find out who the subject ”people” is, and to analyse 
the rights bestowed to “peoples” within the RTD, it is imperative to be able 
to have a clear definition of what “peoples” are. The right of “peoples” has 
been discussed in several context, e.g. within the framework of self-
determination, indigenous peoples rights etc.. The aim of the section is to 
identify what a “people” in relation to the RTD.  
 
4.3.2.1 Is The Right of Peoples a Right of States? 
 
Many governments, such as the US, and scholars, such as Donnelly, have in 
different ways argued that the state could be a rights-holder in the RTD. 
This is a somewhat strange statement, since the state is not formally named 
in article 1 of the DRD as one of the rights-holders of the RTD. This section 
briefly recounts some of the arguments that have been given for considering 
the state as a rights-holder.  
 
Afterwards I discuss if the term “peoples” can be interpreted as meaning the 
state. Since there are only two identified rights-holders, the individual and 
the collective “peoples”, it is safe to assume that if the DRD lacks an 
express right of states it must be in the collective sphere of the right that 
certain persons has interpreted such a right. That is also why I am discussing 
the question of states as rights-holders in this chapter. Any assertion that 
states have rights according to the RTD, is therefore only valid if the rights-
holder “people” could be interpreted as a euphemism for the state. To be 
able to examine whether this is a valid interpretation of states I trace the 
assertion that states are a rights-holder according to the RTD, from its origin 
in the early 1960s to the state of the RTD today. This includes an analyse of  
the travaux préparatoires of the declaration, as well as academic 
commentary. 
 
                                                
96 Article 1 (1) DRD. 
97 Article 1 (2) DRD. 
98 Article 2 (3) DRD. 
99 Article 3 (1) DRD. 
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Orford has explained that an issue that has always been the cause of 
argument regarding the interpretation of the subjects of development, is 
whether the RTD entails a right of states. Both governments that seek to 
adopt the right as well as governments that aim to discredit the right have 
argued that the RTD could be interpreted to grant a right of states. It is 
argued that this right would prescribe that the state could pursue an 
economic model of development, and that this could be used as a 
justification for circumventing the human rights of people in their territory. 
What is more troubling is that this interpretation seems to have gained 
acceptance by many states and scholars.100  
 
One state that assumes that there is a right of states in the RTD is the United 
States. In a meeting of the UNCHR:s 61st session in 2005 their 
representative mentioned that 
 
[…] one could talk about an individual’s right to development, but 
not a nation’s right to development, at least not within the context 
of the Commission, for the simple reason that nations did not have 
human rights, people did. While nations might have sovereign 
rights, it was not within the Commission’s mandate to discuss 
them […]101 
 
 
This statement makes it obvious that the United States interpret that the 
RTD includes a right of states.  
 
Furthermore several scholars have discussed the unsuitability of having 
states as rights-holders in human rights in general and the right to 
development in particular. Jack Donnelly, one of the most notable writers on 
this topic, wrote extensively on this fact, prior to the adoption of the DRD. 
In this piece Donnelly argued that a human right for the state is a logical 
contradiction, since human rights are bestowed to the individual person as a 
guarantee against the tyranny of the state. In this respect human rights 
functions as claims on the state to protect the individual, or claims on the 
state to provide the individual with certain necessities, such as a standard 
level of “goods, services and opportunities”.102  
 
In similar terms, he argues that a right of the collective, primarily of 
“peoples”, would not be a human right. His arguments were that a collective 
rights will essentially be exercised by the state. 103 Felix Kirchmeier104, a 
                                                
100 Orford, Anne, ”Globalization and the Right to Development”. In: Alston, Philip (ed.), 
People’s Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 135. 
101 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Summary records of meetings No. 16 of 
the sixty-first regular session, held on 22 March 2005, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/SR.16, para. 
71. 
102 Donnelly (1985), p. 499. 
103 Ibid., p. 498 f. The question of representation will be discussed in further detail in 
section 4.3.2.4 of this paper. 
104 It should be noted, however, that Kirchmeier is a proponent of the RTD, as opposed to 
Donnelly who opposes the right. 
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practitioner who has studied the RTD, makes the same argumentative leap 
stating that is states could be viewed as rights-holder is they are representing 
“peoples”.105 In this sense it seems like Donnelly and Kirchmeier are 
confusing the question of representation of a “people” with the actual rights-
holders. Seeming to suggest that, if in fact the state would have to exercise 
the right granted to “people”, the right will essentially be a right of states. 
 
As referenced above the first version of a ”right to development”106 that 
arose in international discourse was aimed as a right of states and “peoples” 
alike. This proposal for a new legal regime was closely related to the ”new 
international economic order”. Thus it called for a reformation of the 
international law system that would be based on values such as solidarity, 
social relations between states and co-operation of states on different stages 
of development. Bedjaoui expressed that the right to development in this 
context, would place a firm obligation on developed states to advance 
development in less developed states. Bedjaoui explained this proposed 
relation between states in his address at the congress of the Association of 
Attenders and Alumni of The Hague Academy of International Law on 
theme “new international social law” in 1969. The congress was convened 
by Algeria, Bedjaoui’s home state, which was an early proponent of the idea 
of an RTD. 107 He presented his ideas of the right to development in the 
following manner: 
 
The gulf separating the rich and poor countries is growing ever 
wider and this threatens disastrous consequences for the entire 
human race. The problems of the ‘proletarians of all nations’, 
taken individually, must not make us forget those of the 
‘proletarian nations’ of the international community. What we 
need is an international social law on the scale of nations. The 
developing countries… recently called for international solidarity 
in Algiers at the Conference of the 77… Economic co-operation 
must be the expression of a new international law which entails for 
the most well off States the obligation to contribute to the 
development of the most disadvantage countries in a spirit of 
human solidarity to the exclusion of any idea of exploitation.108  
 
When the RTD subsequently became more formalised it changed its legal 
structure, and was from 1972 and onwards placed among human rights.109 
                                                
105 Kirchmeier, Felix, ”The Right to Development – where do we stand?: State of the debate 
on the Right to Development”. In: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Occasional Papers No. 23, 
2006, p. 12. Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/50288.pdf [Accessed on 
25th April 2013]. 
106 Note that this is not the RTD as it is understood in the DRD or the contemporary 
interpretation of the RTD. This was an earlier discourse, before the aim of development 
was framed in a human rights context. See this distinction in; Bedjaoui, p. 1179. In this 
portion of his text Bedjaoui explains that the RTD was placed firmly within human rights 
discourse in 1972 by Kéba Mbaye, as has also been explained in chapter 2. 
107 Bedjaoui, p. 1177 ff.  
108 Originally in Bedjaoui, Mohammed, ”Pour un nouveau droit social internatioal”. In: 
Annuaire de A.A.A. – Yearbook of the A.A.A., The Hague, 1969, Vol. 39, p. 29, as cited in 
Bedjaoui, p. 1178. 
109 Bedjaoui, p. 1179. 
 38 
However, the belief that the right, even in its new form as a human right, 
should entail a right of states to development was maintained even after this 
transformation. In the first draft declaration of the RTD, which was a 
compilation of proposals by the Working Group of Governmental Experts 
on the Right to Development (WGGE), there was an explicit reference to 
the right of states. The draft prescribed that: “The right to development is 
the right of all States and peoples for peaceful, free and independent 
development.”110 Sadly, since this document was a compilation of different 
proposals there is no indication on what state or states actually proposed this 
wording. 
 
The perception that states could be a rights-holders within a human right 
was a topic of contention in international discussions of the right to 
development. This matter was also the object of several discussions at the 
Third Committee of the UNGA. Among others in 1984 the delegate from 
Canada affirmed that his government did in fact support the efforts to define 
a new human right to development, however his state vocalized the 
discontent that there was a “persistent tendency to attribute human rights to 
States”.111 A similar objection was raised by the delegate of Finland at the 
same meeting, by also stating that his state could envision their country 
supporting the RTD, but at that stage there was an over emphasis on the 
right of states.112 
 
The explicit reference to a right of states to development was soon omitted, 
and subsequent drafts and consolidated texts from the WGGE did not 
contain such a provision. The same applied for drafts sent from other states 
or organisations to the Working Group. The only part that remained was a 
reference to the right of “peoples” and of the human person.113  
 
Even though the reference to a direct right of states to development was 
removed from the first article of the DRD, one reference to the ”right of the 
state” was left in Article 2 (3) of the adopted DRD. Article 2 (3) of the DRD 
states that: 
 
States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national 
                                                
110 Report of the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right to Development, of 
9 December 1982, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/11, Annex IV, page 5, Part One, para. 2. 
111 Third Committee of the General Assembly, Summary records of meetings No. 34 of the 
thirty-ninth regular session, held on 8 November 1984, UN Doc. A/C.3/39/SR.34, para. 8. 
112 Ibid., para. 13. 
113 Among others, noteworthy examples are; The Technical Consolidated Text from the 
WGGE after their sixth and seventh session where in article 1 it is prescribed that ”The 
right to development is an inalienable human right of every person, individually or in 
entities established pursuant to the right of association, and of other groups, including 
peoples.”, found in Report of the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right to 
Development, of 14 November 1983, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/13, Annex II. Other examples 
can be found in the WGGE’s report from its 8th and 9th sessions, In Annex II the Non-
Aligned Movements draft proposal only mentions peoples and individuals as possessing the 
right, in Article 1. The same was the case in Article 3 of a draft proposal submitted from 
France and the Netherlands in Annex III. Report of the Working Group of Governmental 
Experts on the Right to Development, of 24 January 1985, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/11. 
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development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the 
well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the 
basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in 
development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting 
therefrom. 
 
The question is therefore if this makes states a rights-holder or if it could 
indicate that “people” should be interpreted as the state. 
 
This should not be misinterpreted to create an actual right of the state as a 
recipient vis-a-vis development. When analysing this article it is of 
importance to look at the actual formulation of the articulated norm. The 
article merely prescribes that the state is the holder of the right to function 
as an agent of development towards its own population, both as “peoples” 
and as individuals. In that respect it should only mean that the state has a 
possibility to assert its right to formulate national development policies 
toward forces that are denying or constraining its capacity to do so.114 But it 
does not imply a human right of states.  
 
At the time, there was a real concern of some states that international forces 
in the form of states and institutions would misuse the argument of human 
rights to exert political leverage on other states, which could explain the 
inclusion of the word right in the above mentioned article. The delegate of 
Yugoslavia to the Third Committee of the UNGA expressed this fear in the 
following manner: 
 
The Member States should bear in mind that the realization of all 
human rights depend on national and international conditions, and 
in particular on the effective and selfless co-operation to which 
they were committed under Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Charter. 
Yet, human rights were often misused for political purposes or, as 
was particularly the case at present, seriously jepardized by the 
deterioration of international relations, which were characterized 
by the violation of the right of States to sovereignty and 
independence, military intervention and foreign interference in the 
internal affairs of countries, policies of domination and hegemony 
and the confrontation of the great Powers in their struggle to 
preserve spheres of influence, colonialist and neo-colonialist 
policies and persistent efforts to perpetuate the current unjust 
system of international economic relations. As had been stated at 
the Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 held at the beginning of 
the current session, it was the non-aligned and other developing 
countries which were most adversely affected by that situation 
[…]115 
 
As a conclusion to this section I will argue that it is evident that the right 
granted to “people” in the RTD should not be viewed as a right of the state.  
 
                                                
114 Orford, p. 137. 
115 Third Committee of the General Assembly, Summary records of meetings No. 34 of the 
thirty-ninth regular session, held on 8 November 1984, UN Doc. A/C.3/39/SR.34, para. 20. 
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First of all, in the origins of the RTD a right of states was argued for by 
certain states and the WGGE itself. The RTD was then affirmed as a right of 
states, peoples and individuals. After being criticised the term “states” was 
subsequently excluded from the various draft declarations as well as the 
following declaration. Omitting the inclusion of the state as a rights-holder 
in the RTD was therefore a concious decision and should inevitably be 
interpretad as indicating that the state is not a rights-holder. 
 
Secondly, in the early drafts of the right, both the state and “peoples” were 
identified as rights-holders. This must lead to the conclusion that the 
different terms had different connotations in respect to the RTD. It is 
therefore unadvisable to believe that the right of “peoples”, should be 
interpreted as a right of states. They had existed independently from each 
other in previous drafts, and should therefore have different definitions. 
 
Third, when it comes to the interpretation of article 2 (3) I believe that the 
article in essence prescribes a duty upon the state to formulate ”right-based” 
domestic development policies, in accordance to the values enunciated in 
the DRD. At the same time it prescribes that the state has the sole right to 
formulate these development policies without interference from other states 
or institutions. These two facts should not be viewed as controversial or 
paradoxical, since it is a general princple of international law, that states are 
sovereign and by extension therefore have the right to manage their own 
territories in any way they see fit. This includes creating and implementing 
development polices.116 This article should, therefore, not in any way be 
interpreted as suggesting that there is a right of states in the RTD. 
 
Fourth and lastly comes the question of representation. This aspect of the 
right of “peoples” is discussed in section 4.3.2.6. But I it it as imperative for 
the readers understanding to confront Jack Donnelly’s claims here. The 
question of representation is irrelevant when discussing the actual holder of 
the right, since the rights-holder is always meant to be the subject of the 
particular right. If an entity other than the rights-holder is responsible to 
exercise the right for a right-holder, it should be considered that the entity’s 
task is to enforce the right on behalf of the subject. In this way the right 
itself does not shift hands. Therefore in the case of rights and representation 
we must always distinguish between enjoying a legal claim and having 
procedural capacity to exact it. This position has, inter alia, been conveyed 
by the international law scholar Sir Hersch Lauterpacht.117 The UN 
Secretary-General (UNSG) has contextualized this by using an analogous 
example, that of infants’ or weak minded persons’ standing in domestic law. 
These individuals are subjects of the law and have rights but they lack 
procedural capacity to actuate these claims themselves.118 However, if these 
                                                
116 For example see Article 2 (1) (4) and (7) in the Charter of the United Nations, of 26 June 
1945 (UN Charter), which prescribes different dimensions of the principle of sovereignty. 
117 Lauterpacht, Hersch, International Law: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch 
Lauterpacht. Vol. 2, The law of peace, p. 1 : International Law in General, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p. 510. 
118 Report of the Secretary-General (1979), p. 44. 
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individuals’ rights are asserted for them by a different person, it does not 
mean that the legal claim itself has shifted hands. The infant or weak 
minded person still retains ownership of the right. 
 
4.3.2.2 The Parallel Between the Law of Self-
Determination and the Right to Development 
When examining ”peoples” in the RTD a good references point is the law of 
self-determination. The understanding of the term “peoples” is generally 
associated with the notion of self-determination. This is also the case of the 
the RTD where self-determination has explicitly been mentioned as a 
feature of the RTD in the DRD.119 Similarly when the subject “peoples” has 
been incorporated into other human rights instruments it is usually as a right 
to self-determination, such as in article 1 of the ICESCR and article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Furthermore 
Mohammed Bedjaoui has held that the RTD has its origin in the peoples’ 
right to self-determination, thereof suggesting that the concepts are 
undoubtedly linked.120 Since the RTD and self-determination of “peoples” is 
intrinsically linked it seems relevant to use analogies from the concept of 
”peoples” within the framework of the right to self-determination for 
discerning how that term should be interpreted in the RTD.  
 
This section will first examine whether a general definition can be found of  
“peoples” utilizing concepts from self-determination discourse. Moving on I 
will in two sub-sections discuss whether “peoples” in the RTD should be 
understood as the entire population of a country or as minority groups and 
indigenous peoples. 
 
Self-determination is a widely used term, and the conventions, UN 
declarations and resolutions that mention it are numerous.121 It is elevated as 
one of the most fundamental legal norms in international law, and is not 
seldom referred to as jus cogens.122 There is, however, a problem regarding 
the  understanding of the norm, which is that the term “people” continually 
is not defined, in these instruments. This fact makes the concept of “people” 
very ambiguous and vague.123 For the purpose of my question, i.e. of trying 
                                                
119 See, inter alia, Article 1 (2) DRD. 
120 Bedjaoui, p. 1184. 
121 Nirmal, B.C., The Right to Self-Determination in International Law, Deep & Deep 
Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1999, p. 100 ff. 
122 Anaya, S. James, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2nd ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 97. 
123 Nirmal, p. 100 ff; Türk, Danilo, ”The Human Right to Development”. In: van Dijk, 
Pieter, van Hoof, Fried, Koers, Albert and Kamiel, Mortelmans, Restructuring The 
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Law and Taxation Publishers in co-operation with the Netherlands Institute for Social and 
Economic Legal Research, NISER in Utrecht, Deventer, p. 88; Cristescu, Aureliu, The 
Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Development on the Basis of United 
Nations Instruments, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, United Nations Publication, New 
York, 1981, paras. 269-279. 
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to define the subject “people” within the context of the RTD, this problem is 
rather unfortunate.   
 
Several scholars and jurists have, however, tried to construct a definition of 
the term “people”. In broad strokes these definitions refer to a group which 
inhabits three characteristics in common; a ‘common language’, ‘common 
culture’ and a ‘common fate’ (‘historical community’). Furthermore it has 
been proposed that a group of people can only be defined as a “people” if 
they are large in number and populate a common territory. In summary the 
group should be linked by one or several of the following characteristics; 
“national, cultural, linguistic, religious bond, common history, economic 
and social life and even state power.”124 As such, a “people” constitute a 
social entity with a distinct identity and in some aspects unique 
characteristics, that can be linked to a specific territory. The relationship to 
territory is, however,  not terminated if the “people” are forcibly removed.125  
 
In an international meeting of experts hosted by the UN Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), on the topic of the rights 
of “people”, the experts discussed how “people” should be interpreted in 
different instruments. The meeting did not, however, result in a clear 
definition for “peoples”. Even though the experts did not relay a fixed 
definition, they did give some advice on how to view “peoples”. In their 
opinion it is possible that the group “peoples” may differ, depending on the 
purpose of the law in which the term appear. As such, when discerning what 
the term “peoples” means in respect of “peoples’ rights”, it is advisable to 
distinguish what the value or function connected to the rights in question 
is.126 Simply stated “peoples” should be interpreted with the help of the 
object and purpose of the relevant instrument. 
 
While not creating a definition for “peoples”, the meeting proposed a set of 
characteristics that they believed were inherent in the description of the 
“people”. The following characteristics were suggested: 
 
1.  a group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all 
of the following common features: 
 (a) a common historical tradition;  
 (b) racial or ethnic identity;  
 (c) cultural homogeneity;  
 (d) linguistic unity;  
 (e) religious or ideological affinity; 
 (f) territorial connection; 
 (g) common economic life; 
2.  the group must be of a certain number which need not be 
large (e.g. the people of micro States) but which must be more than 
a mere association of individuals within a State; 
                                                
124 Nirmal, p. 118 f. 
125 Ibid., p. 119. 
126 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, International Meeting 
of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples: Final Report and 
Recommendations, UN Doc. SHS-89/CONF.602/7, 1990, para. 22-23. 
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3.  the group as a whole must have the will to be identified as a 
people or the consciousness of being a people – allowing that 
groups or some members of such groups, though sharing the 
foregoing characteristics, may not have the will or consciousness; 
and possibly; 
4.  the group must have institutions or other means of 
expressing its common characteristics and will for identity.127 
 
Depending on how homogenous the population of a certain country is, these 
characteristics could seem to refer to the entire population as a whole or 
indigenous peoples as well as minority groups in the country. Thus, even 
though some broad criteria exists they are of little or no help. In the next 
sub-sections I will discuss if “peoples” in the RTD could be understood as 
either or both the entire population or minority groups and indigeouns 
peoples. 
 
4.3.2.2.1 Peoples as Entire Populations 
 
Two instruments that should be at the forefront when discerning the 
meaning of “people” in the RTD are the ICESCR and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In Article 1(2) of the DRD 
there is a direct reference to the “International Covenants on Human Rights” 
while stipulating the rights of peoples to self-determination. This right is 
evident in the two covenants in their respective first articles, which is 
articulated in the exact same manner.128 Danilo Türk129 has affirmed that 
“people”, in the RTD, should be understood in the meaning given to it in 
relation to “people” that have a right to self-determination in accordance to 
international covenants on human rights. According to him this was also the 
opinion of the WGGE.130 But returning to our original dilemma there has 
not been established a permanent or universally accepted definition for the 
term in context to the covenants, neither by the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee (UNHRC) nor the United Nations Committee of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).131 
 
                                                
127 Ibid., para. 22. 
128 Article 1 ICCPR, Article 1 ICESCR. 
129 Danilo Türk is a former member of the WGGE. 
130 Türk, p. 88. 
131 Joseph, Sarah, Schultz, Jenny and Castan, Melissa, The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2000, p. 100 f; United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12: The 
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the same, it might have felt redundant to elaborate two General Comments of the exact 
same article.  
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Even though this is the case there is one preeminent interpretation of what 
the definition, in connection to the ICCPR and the ICESCR, should be. This 
was formulated by Antonio Cassese. After interpreting the provisions in 
light of the treaties preparatory work and general spirit and context of the 
law, Cassese concludes that “people” should be defined as: 
1. “entire populations living in independent and sovereign States, 
2. entire populations of territories that have yet to attain independence, 
and 
3. populations living under foreign military occupation.”132 
This definition of “peoples” in regards to the ICCPR has also been affirmed 
by Manfred Nowak in his Commentary to the convention. When 
commenting on article 1 of the ICCPR Nowak has simply referred to 
Cassese’s interpretation, thus granting it authority.133 
 
Furthermore if we examine the second paragraph in the preamble and 
Article 2 (2) of the DRD, it seems to suggest a corresponding definition to 
peoples. In these texts it is referred to “the constant improvement of the 
well-being of the entire population and of all individuals […]”. As can be 
seen the right of “peoples” are not directly referenced in these segments of 
the text, however a “new” collective entity, “the entire population”, is. This 
could be interpreted as an evidence that the interpretation of Cassese on 
“people” in the ICCPR could be adequate also for the RTD. However, we 
cannot with certainty determine it is. 
 
When the OEWG  is discussing the RTD their usage of the term “people” 
seem to suggest that they generally use it as meaning he entire population of 
the state.134 The same observation could be made when reading several 
scholars work on the RTD.135  
 
The definition of “people” in the RTD could therefore, possibly be 
analogous to the definition formulated by Cassese in connection to 
international covenants on human rights. However, this is problematic for 
reasons that will be discussed below. 
 
4.3.2.2.2 Peoples as Minority Groups and Indigenous 
peoples 
A question that arises when trying to figure out a definition for “people” is 
whether it could be viewed as several fragmented “collectives of people”, 
                                                
132 Cassese, Antonio, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge 
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133 Nowak, Manfred, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd 
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such as minority groups and indigenous peoples, within the state. This 
would de-bunk the theory elaborated above. 
 
Koen De Feyter has written that the rights-holder “people” in the DRD, 
originally was meant to refer to the “entire population of states”. He does 
not offer any references for this assertion, other than the belief that the 
explicit reference to self-determination should be understood as meaning the 
entire population.136 De Feyter also mentions that at the time when the DRD 
was drafted, the rights of indigenous peoples had not entered international 
discourse. The question of indigenous rights came into prominence later.137 
However, De Feyter argues that indigenous peoples should fall under the 
category of “people” in its current interpretation. He derives this fact from 
the Endorois-case and the fact that the RTD has been included in UNDRIP 
(both of these will be elaborated on below). Furthermore he states that there 
is reason to believe that other groups than indigenous peoples, should also 
be included in the definition of a “people” in the RTD.138 
 
In the context of self-determination Anaya has argued that understanding 
“peoples” as only referencing the entire population of a sovereign or 
colonized state is obsolete.139 Instead “peoples” should be viewed as “all 
those spheres of community, marked by elements of identity and collective 
consciousness, within which people’s lives unfold – independently of 
considerations of historical or postulated sovereignty.”140 Thus the concept 
of “people” could also include communities of indigenous peoples and other 
minority groups that share a common identity.141 
 
In the report of the Global Consultation on the Right To Development142 
(Global Consultation) it is argued that the term ”people” in the RTD does 
not necessarily correspond with the same term in the context of a classical 
interpretation of self-determination. In their opinion the terminology should 
also encompass groups in the state, such as indigenous peoples and 
minorities, even though the DRD does not explicitly mention those 
groups.143 In similar terms the UNSG has also suggested that the rights-
holders of the RTD could be minorities.144 
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Returning to the texts of the OEWG, even though it seems like they usually 
value “peoples” as meaning the entire population, there are instances where 
they explicitly refer to the RTD of smaller groups, such as indigenous 
people and minorities. In this context it cannot be discerned whether they 
feel that these sets of groups could also be characterized as a “people”.145 
Similarly commentators have discussed the rights of minorities and 
indigenous peoples under the RTD, also suggesting that they fall under the 
category “peoples”.146 
 
Another indication that smaller groups, than the entire population of the 
state, could be viewed as “people” under the RTD is case-law from the 
African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights (AComHPR). In the 
Endorois-case147 the question was whether the Endorois Indigenous 
People’s right to development had been violated by the Kenyan government. 
This due to the fact that they had been removed from their ancestral land so 
that the government could create a game reserve.148  While discussing the 
legal question the AComHPR asserted that the RTD under Article 22 of the 
ACHPR was a right of peoples and within that norm indigenous people 
should be protected as a “people”.149 Although the norm examined was in a 
regional human rights treaty the conclusions of the AComHPR have some 
merit and should be viewed as guiding even when discussing the RTD in 
general. The RTD as it is stated in the DRD should be comparable to Article 
22 of the ACHPR. A further indication of this fact is that the AComHPR to 
a large extent referenced the DRD and the works of the IE when they 
explained the normative content of the RTD as elaborated in Article 22 of 
the ACHPR.150 
 
A secondary source of relevance is the UNDRIP. It mentions explicitly that 
indigenous peoples have a right to development both in its preamble and in 
its operational articles.151 
 
4.3.2.3 Conclusion On the Character of People 
What can be concluded is that there is a serious lack of conceptual clarity in 
terms of what “peoples” mean in respect to the RTD. The scholars who have 
taken it upon them to examine what a possible definition could be have 
always come up shorthanded, forced to admit that there is no clear 
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understanding of the term under the RTD. However, these examination have 
seldom been extensive. But what is more problematic is that most UN-
forums that have been in charge of developing the RTD, such as the 
UNCHR and the IE, as well as scholars continually keep referencing the 
right of “people”, while notoriously avoiding to define it.152  
 
The interpretation that can be made on how “peoples” should be understood 
in the RTD is that it encapsulates both the entire population of a state as 
well as smaller groups such as minorities and indigenous people. Salomon 
and Sengupta has suggested this as well stating that: “The rights-holder are 
the collective population of a state and in case of minorities and indigenous 
peoples, the right-holders are also group with specified rights within the 
collective.”153  
 
Left to discern, however, is the interrelationship between these different 
groups, and when a group should be considered a “people”, thus becoming a 
rights-holder of the RTD. Unfortunately a more extensive study of the 
definition of a “people” is outside the scope of this paper. An approach that 
can be taken, though, is to use a set of criteria that should the lowest 
common denominator for “peoples”. Since the international meeting of 
experts has given us a set of characteristics that should be considered when 
defining a “people”, it could be useful to use these criteria as a definition of 
a “people” in the RTD. 
      
4.3.2.4 Who Represents Peoples? 
The last question that remains to be answered is in regards to representation. 
One thing that differentiates collective rights from individual rights is the 
question of representation. Since individual rights are legal claims of the 
person, it stands as evident that each person represents themselves in most 
cases. For collective rights however, the claimant of the right is the 
collective group. As such to assert the rights given to the group it is 
necessary to identify the representative of the collective.  
 
The actor that has been identified by scholars as the presumed154 
representative of the “people” is the state. This conclusion has been reached 
from two facts. Firstly, due to the dual nature of the obligations within the 
RTD, i.e. that there are obligations on the national as well as the 
international level for the realization of the RTD155. Secondly, since the 
public international law system is mainly an inter-state system. Since this 
area is still a domain that is operated by states, while excluding other 
entities. It is therefore believed that it is up to the state to claim the right on 
behalf of its “people(s)” within the international community. This is also the 
                                                
152 Alston, Philip, ”Peoples’ Rights: Their Rise and Fall”. In: Alston, Philip (ed.), Peoples’ 
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case for individuals, states are assumed to represent them in the 
international sphere as well. From this process it is, subsequently, meant 
that the state shall deliver the RTD to its “peoples”.156  
 
There is, however, a possible exception in regards to the state’s possibility 
to represent their peoples (and individuals) in the international context. 
Green and Randolph have argued that “in the rare situations (such as those 
that might trigger the Responsibility to Protect157) where there is 
overwhelming evidence that state representatives are unwilling or unable to 
fulfill the core functions of government” the state should not be able to 
represent their people.158 
 
There are some problems inherent in the assumption that the state is the 
representative of its people(s). First of all, several scholars persistently use 
very soft terms when defining the relationship of the state as a 
representative of their people(s). Such as ‘it is up to the state to…’, or ‘it is 
assumed that states will represent people’. However there is no definitive 
answer, and not a real description of what this relationship should look like. 
If states have a duty to represent their people(s) and individuals or if it is 
just a benevolent act of the state. 
 
A second problem with this formulation of a representative for a “people” is 
that it is exclusively attributed towards the international dimension of the 
RTD. There is, however, a very important national dimension to the right, 
since it prescribe firm duties on states to realize the RTD in their respective 
domestic spheres. The question withstand on who the representative of a 
“people” is in a pure national context.  
 
4.4 The Interrelationship Between the 
Rights-Holders 
An interesting discussion for the understanding of the rights-structure of the 
RTD is the interrelationship between the two rights-holders. Granted a part 
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of this question has already been answered in the part 4.1 of this chapter. In 
that section it was explained that a “people” is a collective of individuals 
and that individuals are the beneficiaries when the rights of a “people” are 
fulfilled. The distinction between these forms of rights-holders is that each 
individual cannot themselves actuate the claim of “people”, however in the 
individual rights this is possible. Since this discussion has already taken 
place what will be discussed in this section is whether the rights-holders in 
the RTD refer to different spheres of action, i.e. if it could be understood 
that the right of “people” is not a right in the national context, but 
exclusively a right towards states.  
 
Iqbal has argued that the collective dimension of the right should be viewed 
as an international obligation and that the individual obligation of the right 
should be viewed as a national obligation. Iqbal mainly bases his assertion 
on an interpretation of “people” as meaning the state. Furthermore he 
references Bedjaoui while discussing the collective right as an international 
right.159 In the section that Iqbal is referencing, Bedjaoui writes extensively 
on issues such as state sovereignty, sovereign equality and sovereignty over 
natural resources, in a chapter were he discusses the content of the RTD. 
Even though Bedjaoui on a few occasions actually mentions the provisions 
on the DRD, his discussion is very dissimilar from any other notion of the 
RTD that have I have read or cited in this paper. No where does he mention, 
for example, that the RTD is a process of development. Furthermore he 
never mentions a right of the human person in these pages. Even though he 
cites a “right of the state” on a number of occasions, Bedjaoui does not 
explicitly reference the state as a rights-holder in the DRD, although that 
seems implied.160 Iqbal references Bedjaoui while discussing how the 
collective right should be understood, he writes his argument in the 
following manner 
 
The content of the RTD, according to Bedjaoui, comprises firstly, 
erga omnes, claims (rights of obligations towards all), and 
secondly, a right, due from other states or the international 
community. The first implies that the state must be ‘master in his 
own house’ by having meaningful exercise of permanent 
sovereignty over its natural resources, in the absence of which 
world peace is in danger. ‘State sovereignty, permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources and the [RTD]’, argues 
Bedjaoui, are inseparable from each other and the RTD thus 
deserves to be recognized as jus cogens. The second includes the 
due rights of the state in the global distribution of wealth and the 
right to ‘receive a fair shar of what belongs to all’.161 
 
After this assertion Iqbal, identifies what rights should be viewed as 
collective and thus exclusively international. It should be noted that Iqbal 
only references Bedjaoui in the above cited paragraph, when he actually 
proclaim that all people’s rights denote an international obligation he has no 
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references.162 The reasoning of either one of the authors is hard to follow 
and their views seem separate from the majority of scholars that have 
written on the RTD. 
 
It is my opinion that the rights-holder “people” does not refer exclusively to 
an international right. The argument for the assertion is the following. First 
of all Iqbal has wrongfully interpreted “peoples” as the right of states. As 
has been proven in the previous pages this is a wrongful assumption, 
“people” denote a collective of individuals, which can be defined as the 
entire population of the state and when applicable indigenous people and 
minorty groups.  
 
Having small groups such as indigenous peoples and minority groups as 
rights-holders should further affirm the notion that the rights-holder 
“people” has rights in the national context. The Global Consultation has for 
example mentioned that indigenous peoples have often been “victims” when 
the state conducts development in the national context. Therefore it is 
important that they are allowed to participate nationally so that their rights 
can be fulfilled RTD.163 This should render the interpretation that 
indigenous people in particular and “people” in general have the RTD in the 
national context. 
 
Furthermore the AComHPR have in the Endorois-case tried whether the 
RTD of the Endorois Indigenous People was violated by the Kenyan 
government, their own state authority. The case concluded that this was the 
case. If the rights of “peoples” only referred to an international right, it 
would impossible for a “people” to assert their rights vis-à-vis their national 
government such as in this case. 
 
This should be enough evidence to prove that the rights of “peoples” should 
not be misconstrued as an exclusively international right. Rather it should, 
just as the right of individuals, be viewed as a right towards their  
government as well as the international community. These dimensions of 
duty-holders will be explained further in the next chapter. 
 
4.5 Is the Right to Development a Right of 
All People or Only of People in 
Developing Countries 
 
The last question that will be discussed in terms of rights-holders is whether 
the RTD is a right for all human persons and all “peoples”, or if it is a right 
exclusively for human persons and “peoples” in developing countries. The 
view in this matter differs among writers. 
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First of all it is important to reiterate article 1 (1) of the DRD. In this 
provision it is mentioned that “The right to development is an inalienable 
human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are 
entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural 
and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realized.” It should be noted that the qualifying term 
used in the DRD is “every human person and all peoples”. A textual 
interpretation of this provision is therefore that the RTD ought to be a right 
of all, not only of people in the developing countries.  
 
The IE has, however, mentioned that the “the holders of the right to 
development are peoples and individuals in developing countries as 
specified in the 1986 Declaration”.164 This is an interesting assertion by the 
IE, and it needs to be properly examined by studying how other authors’ 
view the right. 
 
In contrast to the IE Green and Randolph have argued that “the right entails 
obligations on all states, regardless of their level of development.”165 They 
clarify their assertion in the following manner: 
 
This is clear from the text of the Declaration, but worth iterating, 
as the right has often been understood to be primarily a right to 
transfer of resources from higher- GDP countries to lower-GDP 
countries. The principle adopted here speaks both to the 
obligations of all countries to those under their jurisdiction and to 
the external obligations of all countries, including for instance 
obligations of middle- and low- income countries towards each 
other.  
 
Green and Randolph therefore discuss the question in terms of obligations 
of states. Obligations under the RTD will be discussed further in the next 
chapter of this paper. It is unquestionable, however, that Green and 
Randolph refers to the right as a right of all “peoples” and all human 
persons. Furthermore all interpretations of the rights-holders should occur in 
the light of universality. The principle of universality is a norm, which is 
often used to describe human rights. Brems has described that a definition of 
universality is that human rights should apply to all or that they are “all-
inclusive”166. This entails that international human rights instruments are 
formulated to include every person in the world.167 The IE has also said that 
human rights are universal and that the practice of the RTD should adhere to 
that principle.168 In regards to universality he writes:  
 
[…] universality implies that every individual is endowed with 
human rights, by virtue of being human. This principle has 
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sometimes been used misleadingly to exclude certain group rights 
or minority rights or gender rights or community rights from the 
purview of human rights, as their enjoyment is restricted to the 
members of the respective groups.169  
 
Furthermore he states that such groups can have human rights, if they are 
instituted through proper procedures, and if they all they should apply to all 
belonging to such groups.170   
 
It is worth noticing that the IE never mentions that all people in developing 
countries should be viewed as a group or community. However, the only 
way his previous argument, of “peoples” and individuals in developing 
countries being the rights-holders, would make sense is if they could be 
regarded as peoples. As the IE mentions human rights are universal, and 
should apply to all human beings, and if they are group or community rights 
they are still universal meaning that they belong to people of the targeted 
“group” in the whole world. I do not believe that the IE wants to denote all 
“peoples” and individuals in developing countries as belonging to a specific 
“group” or community. Therefore it could be viewed as a paradox that the 
IE both references that the rights-holders are only individuals and “peoples” 
in countries with a specific level of development, but also references that 
universality is a core concept in human rights and the RTD.  
 
After a textual reading of article 1 (1) of the DRD and in terms with the 
principle of universality it should be clear that the RTD should apply to all 
“peoples” and individuals in the world, not only the categories of people in 
developing countries. 
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5 The Duty-Bearers Within the 
Right to Development 
In the previous chapter we examined the rights-holders and their rights 
within the RTD. This chapter will be devoted to the correlative part of the 
RTD, which is; who the duty-bearers of the right are and their respective 
duties. This first part will generally address who the duty-bearers are and the 
obligations that the DRD prescribes for them. 
 
The conclusion on the rights-holders was that they are human beings, either 
as individuals or in collectives as peoples. Then who are the duty-bearers 
responsible for realizing the right? In the RTD the state is pointed out as the 
duty-bearer on two different levels. First there is duty of the state to realize 
the RTD in the national context, and secondly there is a duty on the 
“international community of states” to implement the RTD.171  
 
This structure of the obligations within the RTD is also evident in the DRD. 
Below I have compiled the various sets of duties that can be found in the 
articles of the DRD in a matrix. They have been sorted as national or 
international duties. Furthermore, if one duty refers to several contexts they 
will be in the same row, if not the duties will be in different rows. 
 
National duties International duties 
States have the right and the duty to formulate 
appropriate national development policies that aim at 
the constant improvement of the well-being of the 
entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of 
their active, free and meaningful participation in 
development and in the fair distribution of the benefits 
resulting therefrom. (art. 2 (3)) 
 
States have the primary responsibility for the creation 
of national … conditions favourable to the realization 
of the right to development.  (art. 3 (1)) 
States have the primary responsibility for the creation 
of … international conditions favourable to the 
realization of the right to development.  (art. 3 (1)) 
 The realization of the right to development requires full 
respect for the principles of international law 
concerning friendly relations and co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations. (art. 3 (2)) 
 States have the duty to co-operate with each other in 
ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to 
development. States should realize their rights and 
fulfill their duties in such a manner as to promote a new 
international economic order based on sovereign 
equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-
operation among all States, as well as to encourage the 
observance and realization of human rights. (art. 3 (3)) 
States have the duty to take steps, individually …, to 
formulate international development policies with a 
view to facilitating the full realization of the right to 
development. (art. 4 (1)) 
States have the duty to take steps, … collectively, to 
formulate international development policies with a 
view to facilitating the full realization of the right to 
development. (art. 4 (1)) 
 Sustained action is required to promote more rapid 
development of developing countries. As a complement 
to the efforts of developing countries, effective 
international co-operation is essential in providing these 
countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster 
their comprehensive development. (art. 4 (2)) 
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States shall take resolute steps to eliminate the massive 
and flagrant violations of the human rights of peoples 
and human beings affected by situations such as those 
resulting from apartheid, all forms of racism and racial 
discrimination, colonialism, foreign domination and 
occupation, aggression, foreign interference and threats 
against national sovereignty, national unity and 
territorial integrity, threats of war and refusal to recognize the 
fundamental right of peoples to self-determination. (art. 5). 
 
 All States should co-operate with a view to promoting, 
encouraging and strengthening universal respect for and 
observance of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without any distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion. (art. 6 (1)) 
 All States should promote the establishment, 
maintenance and strengthening of international peace 
and security and, to that end, should do their utmost to 
achieve general and complete disarmament under 
effective international control, as well as to ensure that 
the resources released by effective disarmament 
measures are used for comprehensive development, in 
particular that of the developing countries. (art. 7) 
States should undertake, at the national level, all 
necessary measures for the realization of the right to 
development and shall ensure, inter alia, equality of 
opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, 
education, health services, food, housing, employment 
and the fair distribution of income. Effective measures 
should be undertaken to ensure that women have an 
active role in the development process. Appropriate 
economic and social reforms should be carried out with 
a view to eradicating all social injustices. (art. 8 (1)) 
 
States should encourage popular participation in all 
spheres as an important factor in development and in 
the full realization of all human rights. (art. 8 (2)) 
 
Steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and 
progressive enhancement of the right to development, 
including the formulation, adoption and 
implementation of policy, legislative and other measures 
at the national … levels. (art. 10) 
Steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and 
progressive enhancement of the right to development, 
including the formulation, adoption and 
implementation of policy, legislative and other measures 
at the … international levels. (art. 10) 
 
 
Simplified it can be mentioned that the overall responsibility of the duty-
bearers is to create an environment, both nationally and internationally, 
which is favourable to the implementation of the RTD.172 
 
Other proposed duty-bearers in the RTD are national and international civil 
society.173 But since my research question is to study the concepts of duty-
bearers and rights-holders in the DRD, and since civil society has not been 
mentioned in the instrument, studying this notion falls outside the scope of 
the paper. 
 
This chapter is divided up into four different sections. The first discusses 
complex and contested issues in regards to duty-bearers. What will be 
highlighted in this section is how the question of duties in the RTD has 
divided the international community of states. Secondly the obligations of 
state’s in the national context is briefly examined, and the states relationship 
to the rights-holders. In the third chapter there is an extensive study of the 
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international obligations of states. Lastly the interrelationship between the 
different dimension, national and international, of duties is discussed. 
5.1 Complexities Regarding the Issue of 
Duty-Bearers  
The issue of obligations in respect to the RTD has caused tremendous 
debate within the world community. Politically the question of duty-bearers 
and their duties might be the most contested part of the RTD. 
 
Stephen Marks has described that the contention on the precise role of duty-
bearers can explain why the RTD has not been evolved into hard law. 
According to him the dividing line between states refers to their stance, 
mostly, of how they view the obligation for international co-operation. The 
separating opinion are whether the RTD should refer to a firm legal 
commitment on rich countries and international institutions to transfer 
resources to poor countries, or whether the international obligations under 
the RTD should only refer to an ambiguous moral pledge to pursue good 
development policies. The former of these views is supported by a majority 
of developing countries, by most countries that contribute a large part of 
their gross domestic product as official developmental assistance, as well as 
a large part of international agencies and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). The latter is the argument of a select few donor countries that 
oppose the RTD in general, among these countries are the US and Japan 
(the most unwavering contestants to the RTD), and occasionally Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada and Sweden.174  
 
What can be discerned is that the differences in views are often politically 
motivated. Developing countries feel it is clear that the RTD implies 
resource distribution to their advantage, in the form of  “aid, debt-relief, 
terms of trade and more equitable globalization”, and that this obligation is 
binding in the RTD. Opposite we have the countries that feel targeted as 
donors in development, who seldom wants to feel that they have an 
obligation to contribute resources.175  
 
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr176 provides an excellent example of this international 
schism in the discussion of the RTD. According to Fukuda-Parr the High-
Level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development 
(HLTF) submitted a report to the OEWG in 2010, which stirred a lot of 
controversy among states. She describes it in the following manner: 
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The HLTP177 submitted a report on an operational list of criteria 
and indicators to the 2010 session of the WG. This appears to have 
brought the political divisions to a head, and the proposal was 
rejected by the NAM group on grounds of its ‘overemphasis on 
national responsibilities, [in] neglect of the basic notion of 
international cooperation, for the purposes of creating an enabling 
environment’ (Government of Egypt 2010; European Union 2010). 
This reaction was puzzling to the HLTF, whose members were 
convinced of the international dimensions as the essential value of 
the RTD and intended their proposal to reflect a balanced approach 
with equal emphasis on international and national dimensions 
(Marks 2011). Indeed, the report went quite far in outlining what 
an enabling international economic environment for development 
would require, including issues such as maintaining stable global 
financial markets and commodity prices. In the context of 
international economic policy debates, these positions reflect 
positions of developing countries and quite radical alternatives to 
the status quo.178 
 
Several other authors have also explained this divide between developed and 
developing countries, or as some say between the North and South. Yash 
Ghai mentions that the “North” believes that the “South” want to use the 
RTD as a pretence “to extract resources” with no real intent to actually 
realize the RTD, while the “South’s” view is that the “North’s” reluctance to 
commit to the international obligations of the RTD is due to an interest in 
sustaining the contemporary “unequal economic and political order”, that 
works in their favour.179 Felix Kirchmeier in turn explain it as a fear of 
developed countries that a possible interpretation of the RTD could be that it 
is “a right to everything”, and as such they risk being sued by other states 
and individuals for the fulfilment of that right.180 
 
In similar terms Lindroos has explained that the contested issue over which 
fraction should bear the largest responsibility in regards to the RTD, the 
national state, or the collective of states in the international community has 
caused an ambiguous and diffuse description of the duties in the DRD. 
Lindroos has voiced that just as the question of resolving who the rights-
holders are in the RTD is complex, there is a similar complexity in actually 
distinguishing what the duties of the duty-holders are. Foremost, the 
problem lies in discerning what duties the state has towards their own 
population, but also what obligations can be claimed on other states and the 
international community in general towards developing countries.181 
 
She continues by mentioning that the centrality of the state as the rights-
holder has been affirmed in, foremost, the Declaration, pointing at Article 3  
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(1) of the DRD, see the matrix above. Furthermore she explains that the 
central role of the state is mentioned and reaffirmed in several other 
international instruments.182 Among these instruments are inter alia; 
1. ACHPR, which states that “states shall have the duty, individually 
and collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to 
development”183; 
2. The Vienna Declaration where it is mentioned that: “States should 
cooperate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating 
obstacles to development. The international community should 
promote an effective international cooperation for the realization of 
the right to development and the elimination of obstacles to 
development”184; 
3. The Global Consultation from 1990, where it is also mentioned that 
there are national as well as international obligations on states.185 
The examples are many, and they all mention a national duty of states to 
create development policies and an international duty to cooperate. Lindroos 
mentions, however, that even though this dichotomy of obligations is widely 
mentioned in the DRD and other instruments that reference the RTD, it is 
seldom described “how the respective duties should be assigned”. In her 
opinion the DRD only prescribes general duties in the national level, and 
rather highlights the need for effective international co-operation and 
international collective action.186 
 
Her analysis ends, by stating that it is problematic to definitely define the 
actual duties of the different level of duty-bearers, since this issue is widely 
contested. In her own words she describes it as:  
 
Determining the action required of states is a difficult task; the 
stakes of the South and the North are high when it comes to 
determining their respective obligations. Whether it is the 
developing countries that should take action, or whether – and to 
which extent – the Western countries should contribute to the 
development process, remain contested issues. Clearly, no one 
single answer can be given, but some general guidelines seems to 
exist.187  
 
She asserts that these guidelines are that the implementation requires 
“effective national policies in the national level, as well as equitable 
economic relations and a favourable economic environment at the 
international level”.188 
 
The following sections of this chapter will look into these different levels of 
duties. The aim of the chapters is to clarify if the respective duties on the 
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national and the international level have been defined or if just like Lindroos 
argues, there are only “general guidelines” to what these obligations entail. 
If the latter is true, it is still interesting to see how well the concepts of the 
duties are outlined. The more information we receive on the specificity of 
the duties of states, the more likely it is that this paper will be able to reach 
conclusions on the conceptual relationship between rights-holders and duty-
bearers.  
5.2 States’ Internal Duties 
This section explores the internal dimension of states’ duties under the 
RTD. It has been explained by the IE that the primary responsibility for 
implementing the RTD is vested in states acting in the national context.189 
This is clearly indicated in article 2 (3) of the DRD and article 3 (1). Other 
scholars have also affirmed this. For example Yash Ghai explains that it is 
at the level of the state and through its national obligations that the actual 
realization of the right to development occurs.190 In similar fashion Felix 
Kirchmeier explains that the responsibility to create an environment in 
which the RTD can be realized first and foremost falls on the nation state in 
the national context.191 
 
When discussing the national obligations of the State, the Global 
Consultation stated that: ”Recognition of the right to development and 
human rights in the national legal system is not sufficient in itself. States 
must also ensure the means for the exercise and enjoyment of these rights on 
a basis of equal opportunity.”192 This grants the view that the obligation of 
the state entails positive actions to fulfil the right.  
 
Furthermore they laid emphasis the on the national duty of the state to 
formulate national development policies. They stated that there was a ”key 
role played by national conditions, policies and programmes in the 
realization of the right to development as a human right.”193 In respect to the 
duty to adopt national development policies it was mentioned that suitable 
development strategies where imperative for the realization of the RTD. The 
policies in turn need to adequately address the implementation and respect 
for human rights. However, it was stressed that these development policies 
where for each country to decide themselves, as is indicated by art. 2 (3) as 
well. There is not a singular model on how a national development plan 
should look like, but they had to be adapted to the people and demography 
of each individual state.194  
 
Even though it was stressed that there exist no singular model of how 
development plans look like, it was the opinion of the consultation that 
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certain elements were necessarily included in national development polices, 
for them to be in line with human rights. These elements where democracy 
and participation, the consultation also stated that the development 
strategies needed to “include explicit provisions for the realization of all 
human rights.”195 
 
The IE has also written extensively on this topic in his fourth report. In this 
report the IE aims at discussing national actions in detail, so it could serve 
as a guideline when states are designing a development programme.196 The 
emphasis is therefore laid on the national states obligation to create and 
operate development programming in their national contexts. The exact 
criteria for the creation of development programming are not within the 
scope of this paper, since it aims at examining the conceptual underpinning 
to the RTD. That portion of the IE’s report is therefore excluded from this 
chapter. What will be explained are his ideas in the general scope and extent 
of state’s obligations in the national context.  
 
In his writing the IE mentions that in the national context the state’s 
obligation must follow the general principles of the tripartite typology, i.e. 
that the state has an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human right 
in question. These obligations require different forms of action. The 
obligation to respect implies that the state needs to refrain to indulge in any 
action that would result in a violation of the RTD of its citizens. The 
obligation to protect means that the state need to ensure that the right to the 
RTD of individuals in their jurisdiction is not violated by action of third 
parties, such as non-state actors or individuals. Lastly the obligation to fulfil 
implies that the state itself has a duty to provide for the realization of the 
right, this means that they need to supply the necessary resources and 
service to achieve the right. The IE states that this last obligation “in effect 
[…] implies the obligation to facilitate, provide and promote” development. 
197 
 
In summary the national obligation of the RTD should be understood as the 
main level for operationalizing and implementing the right. The national 
state is thus responsible for actually providing the right to the peoples and 
individuals in its jurisdiction. The precise interrelationship between the state 
and the rights-holders will be discussed in the next section.  
5.2.1 Relationship Between the National State 
and Rights-Holders 
There is a special relationship between individuals and duty-holders in 
respect to the RTD. In the declaration there is a provision stating, “All 
human beings have a responsibility for development”.198 It’s from a reading 
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of this provision that the IE has described the relationship between the 
rights-holders and the state in its capacity as duty-bearer in the national 
level. As has been described above this obligation consists of a duty to 
create national development programming and policies. 
 
In this relationship the thought is that states have the obligation to create the 
environment that is conducive for the implementation of the RTD. However 
the IE has argued, both as a scholar and in his capacity as IE, that this 
national obligation of states does not necessarily extend to mean that they 
are “realizing development”.199 According to him only the rights-holders 
themselves can have the responsibility to actually develop. Which makes 
development a conscious act of the rights-holder, and also obligates him to 
actively participate in the development process.200  
 
In essence this means that the national duty in regards to the RTD extends to 
create an atmosphere were it is possible for rights-holders to realize their 
human right to development. This atmosphere or environment should 
facilitate development, which means among other things that it is an 
environment in which all human rights can be fulfilled, and that it e.g. 
increases the capabilities of rights-holders. However, the development 
process is not a passive process, rather the rights-holder itself is ultimately 
responsible to grab the opportunity to partake in the process of 
development. 
 
5.3 International Obligations Under the 
Right to Development 
As have been said in short, there is a duty in the international dimension in 
regards to the RTD. The question that is answered in this sub-section is in 
what forms this duty takes shape. The aim of this sub-section is to, in broad 
strokes, examine how the international obligations in the RTD have been 
explained by different UN forums and scholars.  
 
The outline of the following sub-chapters in this section starts with a section 
discussing the necessity and added value of having an international 
dimension to the RTD. If in contrary there is no added-value, and this 
dimension was not pertinent for the realization of the RTD, it is hard to 
understand why this obligation was included in the RTD framework.  
 
Afterwards the different capacities in which the state serve as a duty-bearer 
at the international level is discussed. Of relevance for the categorization of 
state’s international duties is a study for the HLTF from two OHCHR 
consultants, Maria Green and Susan Randolph. The study was conducted 
because the authors were tasked to formulate criteria, sub-criteria and 
indicators for the RTD. For this purpose the study had to extensively 
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examine the conceptual framework, to “clarify” its “normative content”.201 
This makes it a good source for defining the wider contours of the duty-
holder dimension in the RTD. While discussing the international obligations 
in regards to the right the authors identified that the international obligations 
can be grouped in two categories. The first is an “obligations of individual 
action with regard to peoples and individuals outside of the state’s 
jurisdiction”, and the second “obligations of collective action at regional and 
global level.”202  
 
This categorization of state’s duties is used in this study, but with a slight 
difference in terminology. At first the “obligations of individual action with 
regard to peoples and individuals outside of the state’s jurisdiction” is 
discussed, which is referred to as state’s external duty in this study. A sub-
section to this section is on the interpretation of secondary international 
instruments that incorporate an external duty. The relevant instruments for 
this study are articles 55 and 56 of the UN-Charter and article 2 of the 
ICESCR.  
 
Secondly this paper discusses state’s “obligations of collective action at 
regional and global level”, which is referred to as state’s collective duty in 
this study. Lastly, I offer concluding remarks on the nature of state’s 
international obligations in the RTD. 
 
5.3.1 Reasons Why There Should Be 
Obligations on the International Level to 
Implement the Right to Development 
There are well-founded reasons why the RTD has established an 
international obligation of states to co-operate and to take collective action. 
This section will address how different scholars and institutions have 
justified the inclusion of international obligations to realize the international 
human right to development. 
 
As has been seen in the section on state’s internal obligations, the national 
state has the primary obligation to implement the RTD for the rights-
holders. This occurs through development programming. The IE has 
maintained, that the realization of the RTD entails more than merely 
fulfilling one or some rights individually, but is a concerted plan of fulfilling 
all human rights. This will in some cases mandate extensive institutional 
change and structural changes to the economy, which is necessary to induce 
a “high and sustainable” economic growth in line with human rights 
principles. Due to these facts he felt it is evident that this process will need 
the assistance and cooperation of other states. His argument being that 
developing countries, which are the states in most need of development and 
therefore will probably have to implement the most extensive development 
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policies, often suffer from a lack of resources.203 Therefore he argued that 
there is a real need for some form of resource redistribution from developed 
countries to developing countries.204 The implied risk being that if not, these 
countries will not be able to fulfil the right. 
 
Fukuda-Parr has also written in regards to the underlying reasoning behind 
having an international obligation. She mentions that the RTD answers a 
specific problem, which is that the realization of human rights is stunted by 
a multitude of hindrances that are beyond the power of any one state to 
confront. Therefore there is a real need for international cooperation when 
realizing human rights. She then describes that there are three kinds of 
impediments that need to be addressed; “resources, broadly defined; 
international economic policies; and systemic asymmetry of power.”205 
 
Furthermore Fukuda-Parr explains what actions in these three areas would 
entail. First, in regards to resources she explains that the realization of 
human rights is a resource heavy operation. There are requirements for 
“financial investments, administrative capacity and improved technologies” 
which are often beyond the purview of developing states, since they have a 
hard time collecting large sums financial resources in either lending or 
taxes.206 To help in this aspect development aid is necessary, but also 
international cooperation and exchange in the areas of technology and 
administration are important components to further development. Second, 
the access to global markets on equitable terms is also needed for the 
realization of the RTD. Fukuda-Parr explains that the current paradigm of 
the global market is unfavourable to developing countries. This, since they 
often face a variety of disadvantages, such as fluctuating prices on primary 
commodities, which often is their main source of “foreign exchange 
earning”, bad trading conditions from other states, and hardships accessing 
markets due to protectionism from developed states. The consequence of 
market imbalances that are adverse to developing nations, she explains, is 
that the enjoyment of human rights in these countries will suffer. Third and 
last with “systemic asymmetry in global governance” she mean that in the 
current set-up of the international system there is a discrepancy in the value 
of the opinions of developing countries as opposed to developed states. It is 
a fact that developing countries, although many in numbers, seldom have an 
equivalent say in global governance, Fukuda-Parr goes as far as to label this 
a “democratic deficit”. Therefore there is a need to strengthen these 
countries positions in global decision-making and governance.207 
 
Another justification for obligations on the international level is the fact that 
in an increasingly globalized world, the actions of one state more than ever 
have consequences in the development, both economic and social, of other 
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states.208 Therefore it would be wrong for any country to assume that they 
can institute and follow any policies, without assessing the consequences it 
will have on the development of other countries.209 
 
In conclusion there are several reasons for why an obligation on the 
international level is pertinent for the realization of the RTD. Therefore 
there is a concrete added value to the concept of the RTD to include 
international obligations in the duty-bearer structure. Broadly these 
justifications can be summarized into two different categories. The first is 
that many developing countries suffers from resource constraints, which 
entails that there is a need for a distribution of resources to these countries, 
both fiscal and technological, so that they have the ability to actually 
implement the RTD. The second category refers to the interdependence of 
today’s globalized world. This entails that national policies of one country 
also have effects on people outside of the countries territory. Therefore it is 
suitable that these countries need to think about the effects of their policies 
on other countries and adjust them if there is a risk that they will harm the 
implementation of the RTD in other countries. This category also includes 
the effect of international policies and international governance on states, 
since an unfair international regime will also lead to consequences on some 
states’ attempts to realize the RTD. The argument here is often, that it is 
developing countries that suffer from unfavourably from international 
policies. 
 
5.3.2 States External Obligation 
This section will explore the duty of states to partake in conduct that helps 
the realization of the RTD internationally. This obligation entails different 
forms of actions for states, and it concerns the extraterritorial effect that 
states’ actions can have. As has been explained earlier, this category of 
duties rest on the understanding that in an interdependent globalized world 
the policies and actions of any state can also have effect on development 
practices and people not strictly within the state’s own jurisdiction.210  
 
What is interesting to examine in this context is in what form this obligation 
should be fulfilled. To make a complete study of all the ways in which states 
need to act to comply with this obligation is beyond the purview of this 
study. However, it is still necessary to conceptually define this obligation 
further. The following section aims at describing the conceptual 
understanding of states’ external obligation. 
 
A relevant provision in the DRD for the understanding of this obligation is 
article 4 (2), which states that: “As a complement to the efforts of 
developing countries, effective international co-operation is essential in 
providing these countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster 
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their comprehensive development.”211 Other articles in the DRD that 
explicitly mentions a duty of states to co-operate are articles 3 (3) and 6 (1) 
DRD. These provisions are relevant for the study in this section since the 
external duty of states is usually termed an obligation to co-operate. 
 
Several scholars and UN agencies have affirmed that in the RTD there is an 
obligations on states to co-operate to realize the right. For example, before 
the adoption of the DRD the Secretary-General stated, “In situations where a 
lack of resources or other constraints, and especially those constraints which 
are externally imposed, prevent the enjoyment of human rights, there is an 
obligation on the international community in general and States in 
particular, according to their abilities, to render assistance.”212 Similarly the 
Global Consultation has mentioned that cooperation of states should result 
in the creation of an international environment suitable to effectively realize 
the RTD. Inherent in this cooperation is among other things “the 
democratization of decision-making in intergovernmental bodies and 
institutions that deal with trade, monetary policy and development 
assistance, and by means of greater international partnership in the fields of 
research, technical assistance, finance and investment.”213  
 
Green and Randolph have, in their report to the HLTF, explained a few 
examples of measures that states take individually that can have an effect on 
the enjoyment of human rights of human beings outside of their jurisdiction. 
They have described it in the following manner:  
 
[…] the impacts range from formally global (e.g. via votes 
on the governing boards of international financial 
institutions); to formally regional (e.g., via votes in regional 
organizations); to specific to people in particular countries 
(e.g., via decisions concerning bilateral aid programs, trade 
disputes, etc.). Sometimes actions by individual states that 
are formally domestic in nature, e.g. decisions concerning 
interest rates or subsidies for domestic industries, have very 
large implications for individuals, groups of individuals, or 
peoples in other countries, even to a global level.214 
 
This is a good reference point when ascertaining the external obligations of 
states. If certain state conducts lead to an implications for the enjoyment of 
the RTD in other countries, these actions should logically be involved in the 
external duty of states to respect the RTD. This seems to be the conceptual 
reasoning in their text. Furthermore external duties of states should be 
understood as individual norms for conduct for each state, even when it 
concerns the actions taken within international organizations. 
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Green and Randolph have held, in regards to states’ duties towards people 
outside of their jurisdiction, that the complete scope of this area has not 
been well developed within international human rights law. Furthermore in 
their opinion one aspect that is not adequately defined in the DRD. This 
regards the preferred action of states, when deciding on policies, when the 
interests of their citizens collide with the interest of people outside the 
jurisdiction of the state.215 This conflict has been discussed by the scholar 
David Beetham as well, I present his reasoning further down in this section.  
 
The study by these two scholars functioned as the material foundation, both 
conceptual and informational, for the HLTF when they constructed their 
final report216 on criteria and sub-criteria that was presented to the OEWG. 
The report studied what operational criteria, sub-criteria and indicators that 
could be used for assessing the implementation of the RTD. As such it 
included a holistic study of the normative content of the RTD, and it 
intended to, inter alia, establish the outlines of the right.217 These indicators 
could be of three types: structural, process and outcome.218 Where two of 
these, structural and process, aim at assessing behaviours of states, 
“structural indicators measure the duty bearer’s commitment, while process 
indicators measure their efforts to ensure the right concerned.”219 In the 
Green and Randolph report they included an extensive list of indicators that 
could be used to identify the responsibilities of states in respect to the 
RTD.220 The HLTF modified the indicators slightly in the report they 
presented to the OEWG.221 Sadly enough, for the understanding of the RTD, 
the state representatives of the OEWG could not reach an understanding to 
adopt the framework. Since, just as Fukuda-Parr has mentioned above, some 
states, mainly developing, thought the report emphasized too much on 
national obligations and not enough on international obligations.222 
However, due to the rigorous academic study that has been undertaken when 
writing these reports, it should be possible to use these two documents as 
reference works, when examining the scope of the duties of states in respect 
to the RTD. We cannot, however, assume that they do adequately reflect the 
full scope of obligations involved, since the documents have not been 
accepted politically in the OEWG. 
 
The IE has also weighed in on the discussions of the international obligation 
of states to cooperate in the RTD. According to him developing countries 
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suffer from limitations in among other things resources and technology that 
negatively affects their possibilities to realize the RTD. Therefore it is 
imperative that there is an international obligation for cooperation. Part of 
this obligation is the contribution of resources but it also incorporates other 
duties. Among other things the IE has mentioned the following aspects of 
cooperation223:  
 
[…] in the context of fulfilling the right to development the 
following would become a part of the obligations of the 
international community: international cooperation for 
supplying technology; providing market access; adjusting the 
rules of operation of the existing trading and financial 
institutions and intellectual property protection; and creating 
new international mechanisms to meet the specific 
requirements of the developing countries.224  
 
The IE also mentions that cooperation should occur in two dimensions, both 
multilaterally and bilaterally.  
 
First, cooperation measures should be conceived and 
executed internationally in a multilateral process in which all 
developed countries, multilateral agencies and international 
institutions could participate by providing facilities to which 
all qualifying developing countries could have access. 
Secondly, bilateral facilities or country-specific arrangements 
would deal with problems requiring measures adapted to 
particular contexts. The independent expert has drawn 
attention to the following multilateral facilities dealing with 
the debt problems of developing countries: structural 
adjustment and concessional financing facilities of 
international financial institutions, world trade organizations 
and developed industrial countries’ programmes of providing 
market access, restructuring of the international financial 
system to solve the many problems of inadequacy and 
instability of financial flows of developing countries. All of 
these require intensive review from the point of view of 
meeting the obligations of international cooperation with 
States trying to realize the right to development. 
 
Moving on several scholars have also studied the nature of states’ external 
duties. When discussing the external duty of states in the RTD Salomon 
argues that this obligation is derived from articles 55 and 56 of the Charter 
of the United Nations225 (UN Charter).226 Marks makes a similar assertion, 
by stating that there already exist an external obligation on states to “act 
jointly and separately for the realization of human rights” in the 
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aforementioned articles and in article 2 of the ICESCR.227 I will discuss 
these articles in the next sub-section, which studies subsidiary instruments 
that can be used to interpret the duty to cooperate in the RTD.  
 
Salomon argues that there is a general obligation for international 
cooperation, which is evident in all economic, social and cultural rights, and 
references it as applying to the RTD as well. Furthermore she argues that 
“the parameters of the obligation to cooperate internationally in the 
realization of socio-economic rights are not yet clearly drawn.”228 An 
assertion that is very similar to the reasoning presented by Green and 
Randolph above. However she feels that this is not due to the fact the there 
is a lack of the knowledge of how this obligation is defined, but rather that 
there is a lack of practical application of the obligation.229 Kirchmeier makes 
a similar argument stating that there are general definitions of the external 
obligations of states, but that there is no precise interpretation of these and 
no agreement of how these obligations should be interpreted.230 Marks 
argues along the same line and states that the duty to cooperate effectively 
(which the provision in the DRD states) can be interpreted in two ways by 
states, restrictively and extensively.231  
 
In the restrictive approach there are three elements that states need to satisfy 
in order to comply with the duty of international cooperation. The first is 
that the state has a policy regarding foreign aid. Secondly, there is an 
obligation to participate in development organizations and forums as well as 
international financial institutions (IFIs), he exemplifies the kind of 
institutions that are relevant by mentioning, the United Nations 
Development Programme, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the World Bank and regional development banks. The third 
and last element is that states should partake in discussions regarding 
development that are hosted by the UN and other international forums 
discussing development. 232  
 
According to Marks in this restrictive view there is no emphasis on what a 
minimum standard of cooperation should be, the mere presence of any 
degree of cooperation is argued to be enough to fulfil the obligation. 
Therefore in respect to aid as long as donation occurs, states would be in 
compliance with their duty. When it comes to participation in development 
institutions, no emphasis would be put on actually encouraging development 
policies, and lastly in regards to participation in UN forums on 
development, as long as states where present, no matter how they vote, that 
would be enough to meet the obligation to cooperate. Marks adds that the 
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justification for arguing that this would be “effective development” is that 
the term is ambiguous and cannot be extended further.233 
 
In the opinion of Marks this is not enough to contribute to effective 
cooperation. He mentions that there is a necessity to make the obligation to 
cooperate more substantive. In this line of argument he acknowledges that 
the process of granting substance to the obligation to cooperate in respect to 
the RTD, must occur through referencing corresponding obligations of other 
noteworthy and related international instruments. Relevant texts would be 
other conventions (such as the international covenants on human rights), 
“the General Comments drafted by the human rights treaty bodies, the 
declarations and programs of action of the international conferences and 
summits, resolutions that purport to contribute to the progressive 
development of international law, and opinions expressed by leading expert 
and institutions.”234  
 
Marks believe that such an interpretation will grant credence to the opinion 
that states have long ranging external duties. These obligations would, 
among others, entail the duty of states to make sure that the actions they 
take nationally, as well as their conduct, such as voting and promotion of 
policy options, in bilateral and multilateral setting is in conformity with 
human rights. This implies that these policies should not cause violations or 
other detriment to economic, social and cultural rights in other states. He 
mentions that these are legally binding for states that have ratified the 
ICESCR, and that they are also a part of the obligations in the RTD. 
Furthermore he argues that these obligations are not exclusive for developed 
countries, rather they apply to both developed and developing states. 235 
 
When discussing external obligations, Salomon argues that states must 
always in their international negotiations, both in multilateral and bilateral 
situations, make sure that policy outcome does not infringe on persons 
human rights. As such the policy outcome from these international 
negotiations must be coherent with human rights values, such as the RTD. 
The same goes for states activities in intergovernmental organizations and 
IFIs, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
UN etc.236 This seems to be in line with Marks idea of an extensive 
interpretation of the obligation to cooperate.  
 
An important aspect of the obligation to cooperate is to create an 
international environment that is equal for all states. The belief is that the 
current regime is based on a structural imbalance, which benefit most rich 
states, and disfavours poor states. This in turn inhibits the possibility to 
realize human rights in the latter countries. 237 Therefore she asserts that the 
objective for international cooperation in development for instance could be: 
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[…] strengthening the role of developing countries in global 
governance so as to be able to assert the economic rights of 
their people, imposing nothing short of a duty to reform the 
existing institutional economic system; establishing an 
independent and transparent debt arbitration mechanism 
[…]238 
 
Furthermore some scholars have talked specifically about the role of rich 
states in international decision making and in the promotion of 
development. Salomon argues that since rich states often have more 
influence in IFIs they have an individual obligation to make sure that the 
decisions taken in those bodies are congruent with their human rights 
obligations.239 Kirchmeier in turn, believes that all states have external 
obligations to “promote, protect and fulfil” the RTD. However he has also 
mentioned that rich states have a special responsibility to help poor 
countries to the extent they have enough resources to assist.240 This in his 
mind is the equivalent of the obligation to fulfil, which involves the transfer 
of resources from developed states to developing states, to enable the 
possibility to realize development.241  
 
The two other obligations that Kirchmeier mentions are promote and 
protect. He mentions that the obligation to protect entails that the state needs 
to “abstain from action that could violate a poor nation’s RTD”.242 As an 
example Kirchmeier mentions that this means that the system of 
international trade need to be restructured, and enable the fair access to 
global markets for all states. The obligation to respect would involve two 
obligations according to Kirchmeier; the first is that in some circumstances 
the international community might have to act when the citizens of a state 
are denied their RTD by their “corrupt” government. He mentions it in 
terms of that the international community may have to “protect citizens”, 
and that this action would be in opposition to “state sovereignty”. He does 
not elaborate more on how this point should be understood, but it seems to 
be a hinted reference to the discussion on the responsibility to protect. The 
second obligation is that states need to ensure that transnational corporations 
in their jurisdiction cannot act in manner that will infringe the RTD of 
developing states.243  
 
Both the obligation to promote and protect to some degree references a 
negative obligation of states. This is somewhat different from the arguments 
that have been presented above. Beetham has, when discussing what 
external obligations in respect to the RTD are, also referred to negative 
obligations. He states that the overarching principle obligation of states 
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should be “not to cause harm or damage”.244 This means that every state 
needs to ensure that any policy or action, which they undertake, or 
institutional actions or policies that they promote, both in the national and 
the international context, cannot by any means cause systematic damage or 
harm to the economic development of another state. Furthermore they 
cannot “encourage a markedly unequal form of that development”.245 This 
principle should be applied by states while acting both in the national and 
the international level.246  
 
Beetham does not oppose the notion that states also have positive duties 
towards the realization of human rights, such as providing aid and other 
forms of assistance to less developed states. However, he asserts that only 
discussing these duties skews the debate somewhat. In his own words states 
arguing for such an obligation “tend to reinforce a relationship of one-sided 
dependency between the developed and the developing world”.247 
Furthermore aid assistance is largely associated with being a benevolent 
action of developed countries towards the developing countries, without 
adequately portraying that the international policies of developed countries 
often perpetrate harm on the development of these states. Utilizing the RTD, 
however, we can change the debate to include the notion of state policies 
causing harm or damage and not only positive obligations derived from the 
duty to cooperate.248  
 
Examples he gives of areas where the activities of developed countries 
structurally and systematically harms the development of developing 
countries are among others, trade, finance and the environment. The exact 
content of his argument is not necessary, but summarized it means that there 
are structural and systemic inequalities in access to markets and finances 
and that these should be mended so that developing countries can access 
them on the same terms as developed nations. Another argument is that 
environment threats, such as global warming, has mostly been caused by 
developed nations, while all nations will suffer the consequences, and many 
developing countries suffers more harshly due to occurrences of for 
example droughts and other natural disasters.249 What his argument gives 
us, though, is an indication of three areas where states most definitely will 
have to review their policies, so as not to cause harm, which are trade, 
finance and environment. 
 
The last argumentation that Beetham provides is based on instances when 
the interests of the citizens of developed states is in conflict with the interest 
of individuals in developing states, which is a problem that Green and 
Randolph have argued is unclear, as stated previously in this section. The 
problem here being what obligation will supersede the other, the state’s 
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obligation towards its own citizens, or its international obligations.250 He 
establishes two principles for when the international obligation should 
overrule a state’s national obligation, one in regards to positive obligations 
of the state, and the other in regards to negative, i.e. not to do harm. The 
first is influenced by Peter Singer and termed “the marginal utility 
principle”, the principle “endorses an overriding positive obligation to 
provide assistance to satisfy basic human rights from the discretionary 
expenditure of the well-off”.251 The rationale behind this argument is that 
there is a huge difference in living standards between developed and 
developing states. Therefore the impact of a relatively small amount of 
resources from the developed country, which would not cause their citizens 
much detriment, could substantially impact the living standards of people in 
the developing country. Inherent is thus a moral rationalisation for choosing 
to abide by the international obligation.252  
 
The second principle Beetham terms “ the relative sustainability of harms 
principle”. This principle argues that the obligation to remove any 
international policies that can cause harm to “economic development of 
developing countries” always enjoys primacy, even if its removal will cause 
harm to citizens in the developed country.253 As can be seen from both of 
these arguments, Beetham only provides a rationale for cooperation between 
countries that are developed towards developing countries. However, these 
rationales do not mention how to solve similar situations between two 
developing countries or two developed countries. 
 
Lastly, in connection to the external duty of states Salomon argues that the 
state should continuously have to monitor their involvement in cooperative 
measures with extraterritorial effect, such as aid and trade. If necessary they 
have to take “corrective measures” whenever their policies are incongruent 
with human rights norms. She continues to argue that it is necessary for the 
state to perform “human right impact assessments” in their activities within 
international trade, aid and dvelopment, but also in assessing the impact of 
transnational corporations in their jurisdiction. Just like Kirchmeier has, she 
argues that the state is responsible that these corporations do not violate 
human rights in other countries. 254 
 
This concludes this section, which aimed at bringing forward different 
opinions on the concept of external duties of states. Several of the 
referenced sources refer to other human rights and international law norms. 
To be able to draw adequate conclusions in this area, I feel it is relevant to 
first discuss the interpretation of these other sources of law. Furthermore 
collective obligations are also discussed before conclusions on the 
international obligations of states can be drawn.  
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5.3.2.1 Secondary Instruments That Prescribe External 
Duties on States 
There are several other instruments, in the form of both hard and soft law, 
which prescribe a duty on states to cooperate with the objective to 
implement human rights. These are instruments that are not directly related 
to the RTD (meaning that they do not mention the right), but can be 
understood as supplementary for the interpretation of the obligations under 
the RTD.  
 
One of these legal sources is the UN Charter. In articles 55 and 56 of the 
UN Charter it is prescribed that the UN needs to create conditions suitable 
for the furtherance of among other things economic and social 
development255, and the realization of human rights.256 Furthermore it is 
prescribed that the states of the organization have an obligations to 
cooperate, but also to act individually, for the advancement of these 
objectives.257  
 
Similarly the obligation to cooperate is also evident in article 2 of the 
ICESCR, which is binding on all of its states parties.258 An important 
document that has elaborated an interpretation of the provisions in the 
ICESCR and developed different forms of international obligations of states 
in regards to the covenant is the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Maastricht Guidelines).259 Scholars 
as well as the IE have affirmed the relevance of examining both the 
covenants and the Maastricht Guidelines in connection to the RTD.260 
Another document of relevance is the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Maastricht Principles). This document was published in 
2012.261 Since it has not been introduced until very recently, it has not been 
referred to in connection to the RTD in any of the literature I have 
examined. However since it studies the area of state’s international 
obligations in regards to economic, social and cultural rights, it should be 
relevant to draw analogies from it in this study.  
 
Finally the UDHR also incorporated a provision, which directs an obligation 
on states to create a favourable “international order” that can facilitate the 
full realization of the rights in the declaration.262 Fukuda-Parr mentions that 
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this is the basis from which the RTD flows, she mentions that the UDHR 
should be viewed as a precursor of the idea of an RTD.263  I believe it is 
important to mention this fact, but I will not delve into it further, since both 
the UN Charter and the ICESCR have more or less incorporated the same 
commitment. Furthermore since those two instruments are treaties and as 
such hard law, while the UDHR is soft law it is in my opinion more relevant 
to study the legally binding provisions.  
 
This section will first discuss articles 55 & 56 in the UN Charter, then 
article 2 of the ICESCR and lastly the Maastricht Guidelines as well as the 
Maastricht Principles. 
 
5.3.2.1.1 Articles 55 & 56 in the UN Charter 
Articles 55 and 56 are examples of what is know as the ”law of co-
operation”. This law takes the form of states joining around a shared 
objective and then agree to take actions to ensure the implementation of that 
objective.264 When exploring the contents of these articles I have confined 
my references to the commentary on the UN Charter written by Simma et. 
al.265 
 
In article 55 we can find the principal rule that prescribes that states should 
co-operate in the implementation and the furthering of human rights, and 
economic as well as social development.266 It is prescribed in the following 
manner: 
 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall 
promote: 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and 
development; 
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and 
related problems; and international cultural and 
educational cooperation; and 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion.267 
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As can be seen the principal scope of this article is the promotional efforts, 
which the UN needs to undertake to further this cooperation.268 Most 
relevant for the RTD are the provision on “economic and social progress 
and development” and “human rights” in paragraphs a and c. 
 
Even though this article does not undertake to define the responsibilities of 
states for this co-operation it is still relevant in one aspect. The fact that 
scholars have said that there is a consensus that the article prescribes a duty 
of the UN as well as member states to comply with human rights.269  
 
The mandate to co-operate to reach the objectives in article 55 is extended 
to apply to members of the UN in article 56. It is formulated in the 
following manner: 
 
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in 
co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the 
purposes set forth in Article 55.270 
 
The article seems to prescribe a firm duty on states to cooperate to further 
the objectives in article 55. However, it must be noted that the provision 
only explicitly mentions a “pledge” of states “to take joint and separate 
action”.  Scholars have maintained that the words “pledge” and “action” are 
open for interpretation. Pledge could mean that states are under a duty to 
act, but that has not been firmly established. Furthermore, to take action can 
denote a host of different measures that states should take, ranging from 
“legislative, administrative, and policy measures as well as the spending of 
funds and the provisions of resources.”271 Since this article is not specific, it 
must, in the context to the article, be up for the individual state to actually 
decide what the proper methods for action are.272 This is an interesting 
assertion when viewed in connection to Marks idea of an extensive and 
restrictive interpretation of the duty to cooperate. Marks mentions that an 
extensive interpretation of the duty to cooperate should be a correct 
interpretation of this obligation. However, Simma et. al. seem to be of the 
opposing view, at least when discussing the provisions in the UN Charter. 
 
Similarly the article does prescribe that this action can be joint or separate. 
"Joint" meaning that it is undertaken by more than two states and "separate" 
logically means that it is national actions undertaken independently by one 
state.273 However, in the interpretation of this article it is not mentioned if 
the separate action is intended to have an extra-territorial dimension or not. 
 
Furthermore the article explicitly references that states should cooperate 
with the UN when undertaking the actions prescribed. The complete scope 
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of this cooperation cannot be ascertained from a textual reading of the 
article. The large questions are whether it entails that states cannot act 
before receiving a clear mandate from the UN, or whether states could also 
initiate joint concerted actions under the provision and then seek 
cooperation from the UN.274 After an analysis the latter interpretation is, 
however, recognized as the correct interpretation by Simma et. al.275 
 
Even though article 55 and 56 prescribe a pledge of states to undertake 
cooperative measures for the creation of conditions conducive to 
development and the realization of human rights there is an ambiguity to 
how these articles should be interpreted.276 Neither is there a clear practice 
on how this cooperation should be carried out.277 The result of this 
vagueness is that there is no guidance on how a cooperative operation in 
regards to human rights should be undertaken. What we are left with is a 
rule that prescribes that cooperative measures are need and should be taken, 
but no indication on how to actually comply with the rule. 
 
5.3.2.1.2 Article 2 of the ICESCR  
 
The ICESCR prescribes the nature of the obligations that need to be 
undertaken by states in the first paragraph of its second article in the 
following manner: 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures. 
 
As can be read this provision actually imposes an obligation on states to 
cooperate to realize the rights prescribed in the covenant. The provision 
does not exhaust the ways in which this cooperation can occur, but it does 
specifically mention international assistance and cooperation in respect to 
economy and technology.  
 
This article has been explained further in General Comment 3 of the 
CESCR. One aspect of relevance in this provision is that the term “to the 
maximum of available resources” refers both to domestic resources in the 
state where the right will be realized and also accessible resources from 
international cooperation. Furthermore the committee refers to articles 55 
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and 56 of the UN Charter, and the Covenant, and means that both these 
instruments indicate that all states hold the duty to realize of economic, 
social and cultural rights. They also mention that all states that have the 
ability to help others should do so. It also references the DRD directly and 
argues that all states have an obligations to respect the principles for 
international cooperation in the instrument. Finally adding that the 
principles in the covenant for international cooperation and assistance are 
important for the possibility of implementing the rights in all of the world, 
without a program to fulfil these obligations it is apparent that economic, 
social and cultural rights risk not being fulfilled in many countries.278 The 
CESCR does not elaborate the international dimension of the obligation in 
any more substance. Thus failing to show in what forms the obligations to 
cooperate and assistance should be undertaken, as well as what the 
specificities of the “programme” where this cooperation will happen is.279 
Due to space limitations I will not extend this examination further than this 
General Comment. 
 
5.3.2.1.3 Maastricht Guidelines and Maastricht Principles 
The Maastricht Guidelines is the result of a meeting of 30 human rights 
experts in Maastricht in 1997, where they discussed the then current state of 
international law in regards to economic, social and cultural rights. The 
result of the meeting was a set of rules in regards to the identification of 
violations to these rights. The rules were unanimously accepted by the 
experts at the meeting as representing current international law.280 
 
In 2011 another meeting was convened in Maastricht to once more consider 
obligations under economic, social and cultural rights. The meeting was 
attended by human rights experts and international law experts. The result 
of this meeting was an elaborated set of principles of extraterritorial 
obligations of states in regards to economic, cultural and social rights.281 
 
Neither one of these documents are treaties, rather the intention when they 
were created was to clarify the obligations on states that can be derived from 
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international law, mainly from the ICESCR but also from other human 
rights treaties.282 
 
At first I will examine one rule in the Maastricht Guideline. The most 
relevant rule in this document for the understanding of obligations under the 
RTD is Guideline 19 Maastricht Guidelines. This guideline explains that 
states’ obligations in respect to economic, social and cultural rights imply a 
duty to participate in international organizations. It is phrased in the 
following manner:  
 
The obligations of States to protect economic, social and cultural 
rights extend also to their participation in international 
organizations, where they act collectively. It is particularly 
important for States to use their influence to ensure that violations 
do not result from the programmes and policies of the 
organizations of which they are members. It is crucial for the 
elimination of violations of economic, social and cultural rights for 
international organizations, including international financial 
institutions, to correct their policies and practices so that they do 
not result in deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights. 
Member States of such organizations, individually or through the 
governing bodies, as well as the secretariat and nongovernmental 
organizations should encourage and generalize the trend of several 
such organizations to revise their policies and programmes to take 
into account issues of economic, social and cultural rights, 
especially when these policies and programmes are implemented 
in countries that lack the resources to resist the pressure brought by 
international institutions on their decision-making affecting 
economic, social and cultural rights.283 
 
It should be clarified that this relates to a states external duty, since it is 
concern the unilateral actions of states, and should not be mixed up with the 
collective obligation in the RTD, that will be presented in section 5.3.3. The 
interpretation of the guideline is fairly self-evident since it has been written 
in an accessible manner, and thus does not need elaboration. However, the 
rationale behind the guideline has been elaborated by the expert group that 
constructed the rule. The reasoning behind it is that international polices, 
activities or programs stemming from cooperation in international 
organizations and organizations affect the enjoyment of human rights of 
individuals in all states. As such there is a risk the actions taken in these 
bodies might result in violations of economic, social and cultural rights. It is 
therefore the responsibility of states to actively ensure that the decisions 
taken in these bodies do not have a detrimental effect on the enjoyment of 
the aforementioned rights. In this context the experts highlight how 
dependent economically weak countries are on effective governing in 
international organizations. Their motivation was that these states often lack 
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the capacity to oppose policies even if they will have a detrimental effect on 
the enjoyment of human rights. Therefore there is a strong moral obligations 
on state that “are in a position to influence the policies and programmes […] 
to bring pressure” on the organization so that all decisions are in line with 
their human rights obligations.284 
 
Moving on to the Maastricht Principles, this document has as its main 
purpose to discern states’ extraterritorial obligations in respect to economic, 
social and cultural rights. Since, essentially the whole document prescribes 
external duties of states, most of it could be relevant for analogous 
interpretation when discussing the external duties in the RTD. For this 
study, however, I will only present a few principles that I feel are the most 
relevant for the understanding of the obligations under the RTD.  
 
First of the instrument declare that all states have an obligation to respect, 
protect and fulfil all human rights both in their territory and 
extraterritorially, Principle 3. This principle is derived from a multitude of 
international covenants and declarations such as the above stated provisions 
in the UN Charter, article 28 of the UDHR, article 2 (1) of the ICESCR and 
the Convention of the Rights of the Child. It is also explicitly mentioned 
that this obligation exists in the RTD. The authors of the commentary to the 
Maastricht Principles, explains that both the ICESCR and the Convention of 
the Rights of the Child obliges states to cooperate to help the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights. But also that a multitude of other treaty 
and non-treaty sources imply that states have an extraterritorial obligation 
for human rights, which are not only economic, social and cultural.285 
 
Both principles 8 and 9 are of relevance as general principles for the 
obligations of states. Principle 8 defines what the meaning of extraterritorial 
is.  
a) obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State, within 
or beyond its territory, that have effects on the enjoyment of 
human rights outside of that State’s territory; and  
b) obligations of a global character that are set out in the Charter of 
the United Nations and human rights instruments to take action, 
separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to realize 
human rights universally.286 
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Principles 9 in turn shows the “scope of jurisdiction” of states in respect to 
the economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
A State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic, 
social and cultural rights in any of the following: 
 
a) situations over which it exercises authority or effective control, 
whether or not such control is exercised in accordance with 
international law;  
b) situations over which State acts or omissions bring about 
foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights, whether within or outside its territory; 
c) situations in which the State, acting separately or jointly, 
whether through its executive, legislative or judicial branches, is in 
a position to exercise decisive influence or to take measures to 
realize economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially, in 
accordance with international law.287 
 
Just like the scholars we have studied, the Maastricht Principles explains 
that the duty of states in respect to economic, social and cultural rights 
includes an external dimension. Generally it means that states cannot act in 
a way, or omit to act in a way that could have an adverse effect on the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights of persons, no matter if it 
is within or without of the state’s territory. As such a country’s jurisdiction 
should not simply be viewed as the territory where a state can legislate, but 
also in terms of situations where their action can actually effect the 
realization of human rights.288  
 
In Principle 13 the idea that states should “avoid causing harm” to the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights is mentioned. The 
principle also adds that “the responsibility of States is engaged where such 
nullification or impairment is a foreseeable result of their conduct.”289 The 
drafters have stated that this obligation kicks in, when there is a real risk of 
harming the fulfilment of human rights in other states.290 This notion is the 
same as the norm Beetham has described in connection to the RTD. 
 
Furthermore there is an obligation of states for responsible participation in 
international organizations, Principle 15. It is pronounced in the following 
manner: 
 
As a member of an international organization, the State remains 
responsible for its own conduct in relation to its human rights 
obligations within its territory and extraterritorially. A State that 
transfers competences to, or participates in, an international 
organization must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the 
relevant organization acts consistently with the international 
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human rights obligations of that State.291 
 
The commentary of the Maastricht Principles mentions that this provision 
pronounces the idea that state parties to the ICESCR, cannot engage in 
activities in the international sphere that are incompatible with their treaty 
obligation.292 This is very similar to the Maastricht Guideline 19. Also it 
reminds us of how several scholars have portrayed the obligation to 
cooperate in the RTD. For example Green and Randolph have also 
mentioned that the duty to cooperate extends to how states vote in 
international and regional arrangements.  
 
Other noteworthy examples is that states have an obligation to ensure “that 
non-State actors which they are in a position to regulate … such as private 
individuals and organizations, and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises, do not nullify or impair the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights.”293 That states need to cooperate “to create an 
international enabling environment”, which favours the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Affected areas for this obligation 
would be “bilateral and multilateral trade, investment, taxation, finance, 
environmental protection and development cooperation.”294 The 
commentary of the Maastricht Principles mentions that this obligation is 
inherent in the RTD. This assertion has also received several commitments 
from states among others in the DRD and the Millennium Declaration, 
which has “implications for the interpretation of the obligations of states 
under the human rights treaties they have ratified, as they embody a practice 
by these states that sheds light upon the interpretation of the existing treaty 
provisions.”295 Lastly it is stated that states need to contribute resources for 
the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights, when it is needed and 
they are able to spare resources.296 
Even though the Maastricht Guidelines and primarily the Maastricht 
Principles have given us a rich interpretation of what the external duties of 
states are, it is unclear to what extent it can be used to ascertain the 
obligations under the RTD. Both instruments are well-researched and 
include well argued provisions from some of the most notable human rights 
experts in the world. However, since the instruments have not been affirmed 
as valid by states, they can only be referenced as how the concept of 
responsibilities ought to be understood, but not as fact. 
 
                                                
291 Principle 15 Maastricht Principles. 
292 De Schutter et. al., p. 1118 f. 
293 Principle 24 Maastricht Principles. 
294 Principle 29 Maastricht Principles. 
295 De Schutter et. al., p. 1147 f. 
296 Principles 31 Maastricht Principles.  
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5.3.3 Collective Obligations of States 
The DRD explicitly prescribes a collective obligation of states.297 Although 
the extent or form of the collective obligation is not elaborated upon in the 
DRD, UN forums and scholars have expanded on the concept. In this 
section I will briefly recount the view of Green and Randolph. 
 
Green and Randolph have mentioned that various actions from collectives 
of states often have a large influence on development process, be they in 
international institutions or other policies. As they say these actions often 
affect several “core issues around development” and the correct 
implementation of the RTD must involve collective actions by states in 
“development related institutions and processes”. These processes and 
policies are hard for single states to control, therefore having an obligation 
in the collective level is deemed warranted. They emphasize that areas in 
which this collective responsibility especially should fall are “global and 
regional financial, trade and development institutions.” 298 The objectives 
stated here are similar to the ones that were described in connection to the 
external duty of states. It is safe to assume that they are the same, which 
means that the collective obligation should also, for example, aim at 
restructuring the international legal order so that it is fair and balanced 
towards all states, and to make sure that international policies do not violate 
the realization of the RTD in any country.  
 
What is understood as being under the responsibility of states in the 
collective is to make sure that “international policies, institutions, processes 
and programs that are under the collective control of states serve to further 
the undertakings set out in the Declaration.”299 
 
This aspect of states’ international duties might be easily mixed up with the 
duty to cooperate. But they are distinct. The writings of Green and 
Randolph suggests that whereas the duty to cooperate denotes an obligation 
for individual states’ to take unilateral action for the international realization 
of human rights, the collective duty of states should be understood as a 
combined responsibility for all states in the collective to make sure that the 
practices and outcomes of programs in the institution they are a part of is in 
conformity with the RTD.300 Green and Randolph, whose primary work was 
directed at formulating methods to assess if the RTD is being fulfilled, 
wrote this in connection to collective obligations: 
 
[…] assessing the collective implementation of the right would 
imply, specifically, measuring the extent to which international 
policies, institutions, processes and programs that are under the 
collective control of states serve to further the undertakings set out 
in the Declaration. That is, assessment of the collective obligations 
                                                
297 See article 4 (1) DRD. 
298 Green and Randolph, para. 67. 
299 Ibid., para. 68. 
300 Ibid., para. 67-68, 70 & 74-76.
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of states would look, not to the actions of any given state (which 
are covered under the individual obligations) but rather to the 
adequacy and processes of the international institutions 
themselves.301   
 
In a different section they elaborate on this distinction of collective rights 
from external rights like this: 
 
[…] the collective obligation tout court serves a different function: 
it provides a shared standard through which all stakeholders, 
including state officials, staff in the Secretariats of international 
and regional organizations, representatives of civil society, and 
members of the public, can assess whether or not a given 
international policy, institution, program or process reflects the 
normative values established by the right.302 
 
However, they mention that this does not mean that the collective institution 
is a duty-bearer; instead the responsibility is still on the states within the 
collective.303 What this obligation does is create a shared standard for the 
preferred outcome of collective action. Even though the exact influence of 
each state is hard to delineate, there is a shared obligation to take collective 
actions that will further the realization of the RTD.  
 
5.3.4 Conclusions on the International 
Obligations of States  
In the preceding chapter I have described that there are extensive 
international obligations on states to further the objectives of the RTD. 
Although the exact scope of duties is not exactly defined it is possible to 
understand their outlines. In broad strokes it is possible to find two 
categories of obligations of states, state’s external duties and state’s 
collective duties.  
 
In regards to the external duties I believe it is possible to discern two 
distinct types of obligations, a negative obligation and a positive obligation. 
The negative obligation has been elaborated upon by for example Beetham, 
as has been shown above, and means that state have to avoid doing harm or 
damage. It entails that state’s have to make sure that their own actions and 
policies, even if they are principally concerned with internal matters, do not 
have a detrimental effect on the enjoyment of peoples and individuals 
human rights in other states. This also includes the responsibility to make 
sure that actors under the state’s jurisdiction do not violate the rights of 
people and individuals in other states. I have termed this obligation negative 
since it means that states should refrain from harmful behaviour. 
 
                                                
301 Ibid., para. 68. 
302 Ibid., para. 76. 
303 Ibid., para 76, at footnote 5. 
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The positive obligation in turn emphasis that states also has an obligation to 
resort to action to help the realization of the RTD. This includes several 
different actions. An important part of this obligation is the state’s 
behaviour in transnational institutions. In this respect several UN forums 
and scholars have mentioned that states have an obligation to promote 
international policies that are compliant with their human rights obligations 
in general and the RTD in particular. This also extended to how the states 
vote in multilateral institutions, both regional and global. This is an 
obligation of all states, however several scholars note that there is an 
asymmetry in the world order, where some states have greater authority to 
actually introduce changes. Since this is the case, the obligation to promote 
RTD-friendly policies in the international sphere especially falls on them. In 
addition to states actions in transnational institutions, the positive obligation 
also entails bilateral measures. Most UN forums and scholars have 
pronounced that rich states, also referenced as developed states, have to 
contribute available resources, both financial, technological etc., for the 
implementation of the RTD in developing states.  
 
Secondly, there is also a collective duty of states. This is closely related to 
many of the aspects I have mentioned in regards to the positive obligation of 
states under the external duties. But there is an important distinction. While 
the external duty centres on the individual actions of one state, the collective 
duty is centred on the combined measures of states.  
 
The aim of the international duties is to create an environment that enables 
the implementation to the RTD. Exactly what areas of international 
governance that are affected, is not clear. The opinion seems to be that all 
parts of international governance that can have an effect on the enjoyment of 
human rights and development should be affected. Notable examples that 
have been given by scholars and UN forums, are to modify the international 
trade system so that it is equal for all states and is not imbalanced in who 
profits from them, restructuring the financial system, making sure that 
resources, such as aid, are available for developing states. The list can 
certainly be made longer.    
 
Similarly, exactly what these specific duties are is uncertain.  Several 
authors, and notably the Green and Randolph as well as the HLTF reports 
on criteria, sub-criteria and indicators, have expanded it but states have as of 
yet not been able to reach a consensus on the interpretation of these rights. I 
believe this is a threat to the interpretation of the RTD. Since, if states do 
not have clear guidelines on how to act in respect to human rights, there is a 
possibility that they will shirk their responsibility. 
 
In addition to the body of work created by scholars and UN forums, several 
references to the states’ external duty and to their collective duty can be 
found in other international instruments. Most authors that describe how the 
external and collective duties in the RTD should be understood, often 
reference provisions in other instruments. Marks even says that this is 
necessary to adequately interpret the obligations in the RTD. The examples I 
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have presented are articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, article 2 (1) of the 
ICESCR, the Maastricht Guidelines and the Maastricht Principles.   
 
What is evident is that there are external duties of states in respect to human 
rights in general, UN Charter, and economic, social and cultural rights in 
particular, ICESCR, prescribed in hard law. However, these documents also 
lack clarity in the extent and scope of these obligations. What is even more 
troubling is that, often when authorities on the UN Charter and the ICESCR, 
describe the obligations in those treaties they reference each other as well as 
the DRD. It seems that the true interpretation of the obligations to cooperate 
has been lost somewhere in excessive cross-referencing. What is left is the 
knowledge that a duty exists, but not how to understand it. 
 
Both the Maastricht Guidelines and the Maastricht Principles are important 
reference tools, since they clearly explain how state’s duties should be 
understood, albeit only in connection to the ICESCR. However it is worth 
noting that they mainly stipulate external duties. Even though the documents 
seem useful to discern how the obligations should be interpreted in the RTD 
as well, I would like to put forward two reservations for this. The first one is 
that the Maastricht instruments were created to explain the obligations under 
ICESCR; even though the RTD incorporates all human rights it cannot be 
taken as self-evident that the DRD should be interpreted exactly like the 
covenant. Secondly, as I have already written, these instruments were 
created by human rights experts and have not been adopted formally by 
states. The legal value of them is therefore uncertain.  Even though the 
Maastricht Guidelines and the Maastricht Principles most probably reflect 
how some of the external duties in the RTD should be understood, we 
cannot be assured of that fact. 
 
5.4 Interrelationship Between The 
Different Dimensions Of Duty-Bearers 
The last question to answer is to briefly examine the interrelationship 
between the different spheres of obligations, national and international, that 
that duty-bearers have.  
 
As has been explained the state has the primary responsibility to implement 
the RTD. This means that it is responsible to implement it in the in the 
national context. This duty denotes that states need to create development 
programming that is conducive to the realization of the RTD. 
 
The question should be how the international obligations of states should be 
viewed in the rights-structure. Labelling the national responsibility as 
primary might make some question whether the international obligation is 
secondary, meaning that it is actualized first when the national state is 
unable to realize the RTD. 
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Viewing the justifications for the international obligations should make this 
last assertion redundant. The reasoning behind the international obligations 
in respect to the RTD, is the understanding that several developing states 
will have a very hard task, maybe even impossible, to implement the RTD, 
without the support in the form of for example resource redistribution. 
Considering that the international obligations are only secondary would 
therefore make the purpose of the RTD void. Kirchmeier has affirmed this 
notion in the following manner: “As far as the Right to Development and its 
advancement are concerned, it is now important that all sides recognize the 
importance of both the national and the international level of its scope and 
embrace both as complementary, not contradictory.” 304 In this respect it 
might be clearer semantically to describe the national obligations of states as 
the principal obligation to implement the RTD in the national context. 
Similarly the international obligation would be an obligation of all states to 
create an international environment that enables the implementation of the 
RTD. 
  
Viewing the duty-bearer relationship as complementary, and that the 
international obligation is essential for the full realization of many countries, 
advances the question of how states should respond to their national 
obligations, if the international obligations of others states go unfulfilled. Is 
this an adequate excuse for states not to realize the RTD in the national 
sphere? The IE has answered this question in the negative. He states that: 
“The overall responsibility of developing countries in implementing the 
right to development, following the human rights approach, is not 
diminished even if international cooperation is not forthcoming to the extent 
desired.”305 
 
In summary, the state has the principal national duty to operationalize and 
realize the RTD in its domestic territory. As a necessary complement to this 
duty, all states also have the duty in the international context to ensure that 
the RTD of all people and individuals can be fully realized.   
 
Lastly it must be mentioned that the complete interplay between these 
dimensions is uncertain. As Fukuda-Parr has noted the HLTF-report on 
criteria, sub-criteria and indicators was widely debated, mostly by 
developing states feeling that the was too much emphasis on national 
obligations and not enough on international obligations. 
                                                
304 Kirchmeier, p. 24. 
305 Independent Experts 2nd Report, para. 33. 
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6 Conclusions 
The concluding chapter of this thesis draws on existent information and 
analyses from the previous chapters; as such it functions mainly as a 
consolidation of my findings in the previous chapters. The first part of this 
chapter deals with rights-holders, who they are and how their relationship is 
understood. Furthermore one gap in the concept of rights-holders that is still 
persistent is discussed. This is the question of representation for the rights-
holder “peoples” in the national context. The second part of this chapter is 
devoted to the duty-bearers in the RTD. Here the scope of their obligations 
in the national as well as the international sphere is discussed. Furthermore 
this part discusses gaps in regards to the understanding of these obligations. 
 
Starting from the beginning there are two rights-holders in the RTD, the 
human person, denoting an individual level, and the collective, termed the 
“people” in the DRD. Even though there are two rights-holders they both 
denote human beings as the beneficiaries of the rights enshrined in the RTD. 
Whereas the individual is easy to identify, the subject “people” is harder. 
Often this rights-holder has been misunderstood as meaning the state, this 
assertion has however been strongly refuted and proven untrue in this paper. 
It is believed that this subject was originally intended to denote the entire 
population of a country. However, there has been a shift in opinion in 
regards to the definition of a “people”. This is partly due to the fact that the 
human rights of indigenous peoples and minorities have come into focus in 
the international discourse concerning human rights. A great leap for this 
shift of views in regards to peoples in the RTD was the Endorois-case from 
the AComHPR, which cemented the view that indigenous peoples are 
considered to be rights-holders in the RTD as it is codified in the ACHPR. It 
has been argued in this paper that this should be a valid interpretation of the 
current state of the international RTD as well, since human rights are 
universal, and since several interpretations of the RTD in the international 
sphere have corroborated such an understanding, among these is the 
UNDRIP and the report of the Global Consultation. 
 
A gap that persists in the identification of a “people” is that there still does 
not exist an exact definition of when a group is considered a “people” in the 
RTD. The proposal given in this thesis is to solve this problem by using a 
definition that answers to the lowest common denominator of the identified 
groups, i.e. the entire population, indigenous peoples and minority groups. 
However, no real definition has been found or elaborated in the thesis. 
 
Describing the nature of a “people” as a rights-holder is also necessary for 
the full understanding of the RTD. A collective rights-holder, in this case 
“people”, consists of individual persons. The group right is always aimed at 
furthering the enjoyment of human rights of the individuals in the collective. 
Therefore it acts a vessel for the realization of rights for human persons. The 
capacity individuals have in the group is as beneficiaries. It is important not 
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to forget about the individual component in the group right, since the 
individual has been mentioned as the central subject of the RTD, article 2 
(1) DRD.  
 
This dual structure of rights-holders is complementary and aims at the 
realization of human rights for all human people, both as individual rights-
holders with their own claim, and as beneficiaries of the claims of the 
“people(s)” (both singular and sometimes plural) they belong to. 
 
A gap that that has not been cleared out in this thesis concerns the 
representation of peoples. When scholars have written about representation 
the scope is always in regards to the international obligation in the RTD. 
However, since peoples have rights in the national context, it is important 
that they have representatives in the national context that can claim their 
rights according to the RTD as well. Scholars have as of yet not solved this 
question but a solution is necessary for the possibility of a people to actuate 
their claims towards the state.  
 
At the opposite end of the right there are duty-bearers. The duty-bearers in 
the RTD are states, and their duties are divided up into two categories, 
national obligations and international obligations. The objective of the 
duties of states is to create a national and international environment that is 
favourable to development, which in turn will enable the realization of the 
right for the rights-holders. However, the IE has pointed out that the 
ultimate responsibility to develop falls on the rights-holders. They therefore 
need to actively partake in the development process to be able to develop.  
 
The first duty that will be discussed is the state’s internal duty. The state is 
considered to be the primary duty-bearer in the RTD, which is prescribed in 
article 2 (3) and 3 (1) in the DRD. The interpretation of this assertion is that 
the state has a primary obligation to realize the right domestically. It is 
understood that the internal obligation is the main level for operationalizing 
and implementing the right. The obligation to fulfil the right in the national 
context applies to all states. As has been discussed in this paper, a mere 
recognition of the right in national legislation is not sufficient for states to 
fulfil their national obligation. Instead the duty requires states to take 
positive action to realize the rights enshrined in the RTD.  
 
One form of action has been mentioned by all the sources examined as the 
preeminent mean to implement the RTD; the creation of national 
development programs. There is no ‘one size fits all’ formula for the 
creation of these programs, rather when these are developed there is a need 
to consider the context they are created for. This includes taking the 
demography of the country and the areas in most need of development into 
account.  
 
Lastly, just like all human rights the nature of the state’s internal obligations 
need to be congruent with the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. This 
means that the state need to; respect the RTD of their citizens and refrain 
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from violating it, protect their citizens from the violation of their rights by 
third parties and take action to fulfil the right by providing essential 
resources and services. 
 
In addition to the internal obligation the DRD prescribes international 
obligations on states. There are two broad reasons for including 
international obligations in the RTD. The first is that several developing 
countries suffer from resource constraints, and without cooperation and 
assistance from other states the full realization of the RTD would be 
impossible in these states. The second is that the world is interdependent, 
which means that the actions and policies of states can have extraterritorial 
effect on the enjoyment of the RTD. The same goes for international actions 
and policies taken by collective action. 
 
The addition of international obligations of states, entails that there are more 
than one duty-bearer responsible for the realization on the RTD. A 
relationship where more than one duty-bearer is obligated to fulfil a right 
has been termed “imperfect obligations” by Sen. Sengupta has affirmed that 
human rights can have “imperfect obligations”.  
 
External duties, denotes an individual obligation of states to work for the 
full realization of the RTD, even outside their jurisdiction. In this paper the 
state’s external duty has been categorized as having two characteristics, a 
negative and a positive duty. The negative duty is argued to denote an 
obligation of states to make sure that their actions and policies, even if they 
primarily concern internal matters, should not do any harm or damage on 
the enjoyment of the RTD of people in other states. This include that the 
state needs to make sure that actions of third parties within their jurisdiction, 
such as transnational corporations, do not cause detriment to the enjoyment 
of the RTD of people in other states as well.  
 
The positive duty of states implies that states need to take action for the 
realization of the RTD in other countries. This occurs both in bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements. Scholars have argued that the obligation includes 
resource distribution from affluent states to less developed states, as well as 
the duty to promote and vote for international policies, which are compliant 
with the norms in the RTD, in international institutions. Furthermore it has 
been claimed that there is an asymmetry in the international community, 
since the opinions of developing countries do not carry as much weight as 
the opinions of developed countries. Therefore some scholars argue that 
states that have greater influence in the international community also have a 
greater responsibility to both further the aims of the RTD, and also to 
restructure the world order to make it equal for all states to participate in. 
 
What has been seen is that the wider contours of the obligation can be 
found. Most scholars promote an extensive interpretation of the external 
obligation, usually by referencing that an external obligation to realize 
human rights has legal basis in the UN Charter and the ICESCR. This thesis 
has investigated both of the abovementioned treaties as well as the 
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Maastricht Guidelines and the Maastricht Principles to get an adequate 
understanding of the scope of external duties. The end result however is that 
sufficient clarity cannot be discerned. Whereas all provisions references a 
duty to cooperate the exact scope of this is not clear. What has been argued 
in this thesis is that the interpretation of the external duties of states have 
been lost in excessive cross-referencing between these various instruments. 
What is known is that the obligation exist, but the exact scope of it is 
unclear. This is a gap in the understanding of the external duty that needs to 
be untangled further.  
 
Moving on, in addition to the external duty, there is a collective duty in the 
RTD. This obligation has been included since development processes in 
most states are heavily affected by actions and polices that are taken 
collectively and since individual states might have a minor effect in the 
adoption of these actions it is deemed necessary to include a collective 
obligation. This should be viewed as a combined responsibility for all states 
in the collective to make sure that the practices and outcomes of programs in 
the institution they are a part of is in conformity with the RTD. 
 
What has been ascertained is that there are several duty-bearers in the RTD 
and that they have national as well as international duties. This takes the 
form of “imperfect obligations” for the realization of the RTD. What is left 
to discern are the actionable duties that these obligations entail. As can be 
seen there exist wide contention among states of how to define these duties. 
This question, however, is beyond the scope of this paper, so it us up to 
other scholars to define this area. 
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Supplement A – Declaration on 
the Right to Development 
41/128. Declaration on the Right to Development 
The General Assembly, 
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations relating to the achievement of international co-operation in solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian 
nature, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion, 
Recognizing that development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural 
and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-
being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their 
active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair 
distribution of benefits resulting therefrom, 
Considering that under the provisions of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights everyone is entitled to a social and international order in 
which the rights and freedoms set forth in that Declaration can be fully 
realized, 
Recalling the provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 
Recalling further the relevant agreements, conventions, resolutions, 
recommendations and other instruments of the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies concerning the integral development of the human 
being, economic and social progress and development of all peoples, 
including those instruments concerning decolonization, the prevention of 
discrimination, respect for and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, the maintenance of international peace and security 
and the further promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter, 
Recalling the right of peoples to self-determination, by virtue of which they 
have the right freely to determine their political status and to pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development, 
Recalling also the right of peoples to exercise, subject to the relevant 
provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, full and 
complete sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources, Mindful of 
the obligation of States under the Charter to promote universal respect for 
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and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, 
Considering that the elimination of the massive and flagrant violations of 
the human rights of the peoples and individuals affected by situations such 
as those resulting from colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, all forms of 
racism and racial discrimination, foreign domination and occupation, 
aggression and threats against national sovereignty, national unity and 
territorial integrity and threats of war would contribute to the establishment 
of circumstances propitious to the development of a great part of mankind, 
Concerned at the existence of serious obstacles to development, as well as to 
the complete fulfilment of human beings and of peoples, constituted, inter 
alia, by the denial of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, 
and considering that all human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
indivisible and interdependent and that, in order to promote development, 
equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the 
implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights and that, accordingly, the promotion of, respect for 
and enjoyment of certain human rights and fundamental freedoms cannot 
justify the denial of other human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
Considering that international peace and security are essential elements for 
the realization of the right to development, 
Reaffirming that there is a close relationship between disarmament and 
development and that progress in the field of disarmament would 
considerably promote progress in the field of development and that 
resources released through disarmament measures should be devoted to the 
economic and social development and well-being of all peoples and, in 
particular, those of the developing countries, 
Recognizing that the human person is the central subject of the development 
process and that development policy should therefore make the human 
being the main participant and beneficiary of development, 
Recognizing that the creation of conditions favourable to the development 
of peoples and individuals is the primary responsibility of their States, 
Aware that efforts at the international level to promote and protect human 
rights should be accompanied by efforts to establish a new international 
economic order, 
Confirming that the right to development is an inalienable human right and 
that equality of opportunity for development is a prerogative both of nations 
and of individuals who make up nations, 
Proclaims the following Declaration on the Right to Development: 
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Article 1 
1. The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which 
every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute 
to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.  
2. The human right to development also implies the full realization of the 
right of peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to the 
relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, the 
exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural 
wealth and resources. 
Article 2 
1. The human person is the central subject of development and should be the 
active participant and beneficiary of the right to development.  
2. All human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and 
collectively, taking into account the need for full respect for their human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community, 
which alone can ensure the free and complete fulfillment of the human 
being, and they should therefore promote and protect an appropriate 
political, social and economic order for development. 
3. States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national 
development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-
being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their 
active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair 
distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom. 
Article 3 
1. States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and 
international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to 
development.  
2. The realization of the right to development requires full respect for the 
principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
3. States have the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring 
development and eliminating obstacles to development. States should 
realize their rights and fulfill their duties in such a manner as to promote a 
new international economic order based on sovereign equality, 
interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all States, as well 
as to encourage the observance and realization of human rights. 
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Article 4 
1. States have the duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to 
formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the 
full realization of the right to development. 
2. Sustained action is required to promote more rapid development of 
developing countries. As a complement to the efforts of developing 
countries, effective international co-operation is essential in providing these 
countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster their comprehensive 
development. 
Article 5 
States shall take resolute steps to eliminate the massive and flagrant 
violations of the human rights of peoples and human beings affected by 
situations such as those resulting from apartheid, all forms of racism and 
racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign domination and 
occupation, aggression, foreign interference and threats against national 
sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, threats of war and 
refusal to recognize the fundamental right of peoples to self-determination. 
Article 6 
1. All States should co-operate with a view to promoting, encouraging and 
strengthening universal respect for and observance of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without any distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion.  
2. All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and 
interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to 
the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights. 
3. States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development resulting 
from failure to observe civil and political rights, as well as economic, social 
and cultural rights. 
Article 7 
All States should promote the establishment, maintenance and strengthening 
of international peace and security and, to that end, should do their utmost to 
achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international 
control, as well as to ensure that the resources released by effective 
disarmament measures are used for comprehensive development, in 
particular that of the developing countries. 
Article 8 
1. States should undertake, at the national level, all necessary measures for 
the realization of the right to development and shall ensure, inter alia, 
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equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic resources, education, 
health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of 
income. Effective measures should be undertaken to ensure that women 
have an active role in the development process. Appropriate economic and 
social reforms should be carried out with a view to eradicating all social 
injustices.  
2. States should encourage popular participation in all spheres as an 
important factor in development and in the full realization of all human 
rights. 
Article 9 
1. All the aspects of the right to development set forth in the present 
Declaration are indivisible and interdependent and each of them should be 
considered in the context of the whole.  
2. Nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as being contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations, or as implying that any 
State, group or person has a right to engage in any activity or to perform any 
act aimed at the violation of the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights. 
Article 10 
Steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and progressive 
enhancement of the right to development, including the formulation, 
adoption and implementation of policy, legislative and other measures at the 
national and international levels. 
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